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Abstract
This Note addresses the issue of whether all nations should enact a uniform global legal
scheme governing digital signatures for the purpose of promoting E-Commerce. Part I of this
Note describes digital signatures and considers their different functions. Part I also discusses
E-Commerce and the application of digital signatures to E-Commerce. Further, Part I briefly ex-
amines the major legal schemes set up by organizations, states, nations, and international bodies.
Part II analyzes arguments for and against global digital signature laws in order to facilitate E-
Commerce. Part III argues that nations should adopt a global digital signature legal scheme in
order to promote E-Commerce by eliminating conflicting laws. This Note concludes that nations
should draft and enact a global digital signature legal scheme.
THE PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF E-COMMERCE:
SHOULD THERE BE A GLOBAL REGULATORY
SCHEME FOR DIGITAL SIGNATURES?
Sanu K. Thomas*
INTRODUCTION
The development of electronic commerce1  ("E-Com-
merce") and modern communications technology has created
the need and opportunity for new business practices.2 The
growth of E-Commerce affects many sectors of the world econ-
omy.3 By the turn of the twentieth century, one commentator
estimates that, in the United States alone, the value of E-Com-
merce transactions will reach billions of U.S. dollars per year.4
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1. See Holly K. Towle, Electronic Transactions and Contracting, 520 PRAc. L. INST.:
PATENTS, COP YRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES
515, 517 (June 8, 1998) (defining electronic commerce ("E-Commerce") as business
environment in which advertising, buying and selling and licensing of goods, services,
and information occurs electronically). E-Commerce transactions are conduced
through networks such as computer networks or wireless communication systems. Id.
Many types of commercial activities can be facilitated using E-Commerce, such as the
transfer of funds, ordering of supplies, and ordering and digital delivery of information
or entertainment products. Id. E-Commerce offers unique commercial opportunities
because of the way in which information relating to goods and services flows. Id. The
convergence of the computer and telecommunications sectors of our economy has
broadened the capacity for digital communication and ele'ctronic interaction using cel-
lular phones, hand held computers, high speed wire, cable, and satellite transmissions.
Id.
2. See Stephen S. Wu, Incorporation by Reference and Public Key Infrastructures: Moving
the Law Beyond the Paper-Based World, 38 JUPTMETRICS J. 317, 317 (1998) (stating that E-
Commerce will affect how parties enter into contracts); see also Towle, supra note 1, at
517 (demonstrating that E-Commerce is quickly enhancing or replacing other tradi-
tional commercial activities). For example, on January 28, 1998, Egghead, Inc. an-
nounced that it would close each of its 80 retail outlets to operate exclusively on the
Internet. Towle, supra, at 517.
3. Daniel J. Greenwood & Ray A. Campbell, Electronic Commerce Legislation: From
Written on Paper and Signed in Ink to Electronic Records and Online Authentication, 53 Bus.
LAw. 307, 308 (1997); see Andrew Urbaczewski et al., A Manager's Primer in Electronic
Commerce, Bus. HoRIZONs 5 (Sept. 1, 1998) (stating that E-Commerce has affected way
individuals and organizations purchase goods and services). Projected E-Commerce
sales are at US$ 4.8 billion, which doubles 1997 totals. Urbaczewski et al., supra.
4. See Catherine Lee Wilson, Banking on the Net: Extending Bank Regulation to Elec-
tronic Money and Beyond, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 671 (1997) (estimating that more than
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The growth of E-Commerce has raised new issues for busi-
nesses conducting transactions on the Internet,5 one of which is
how they will enter into contracts in a manner appropriate for
this new electronic6 environment.7 The possibility of concluding
contracts and other legally significant transactions electronically
raises a number of legal and technical questions about how to
ensure the authenticity' of electronic documents.9  Scholars
have given a great deal of attention to the legal effect of E-Com-
merce transactions.1 ° E-Commerce transactions may not satisfy
200 million people will regularly use Internet by 2000); see also Diane Francis, Welcome to
the World's Biggest Catalogue Store: Internet Bandwagon Takes You to the Hottest Game in
Town, NAT'L PosT, Feb. 9, 1999, at C3 (stating that business conducted on Internet is
currently at US$200 billion).
5. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 (1997) (defining Internet as global net-
work of interconnected computers); see also Craig Peyton Gaumer, Conflicts, The Consti-
tution, and the Internet, 86 ILL. B.J. 502, 503 (1998) (describing history and original pur-
pose of Internet, which began in 1969 as U.S. Department of Defense project designed
to facilitate exchange of information among educational institutions, government agen-
cies, and scientific community). The Internet was designed to make international com-
munication easier because it is a network of decentralized, self-maintaining series of
redundant links between computers with the automatic ability to re-route communica-
tions if one or more links are damaged. Gaumer, supra, at 503. One issue raised by E-
Commerce through the Internet is how to apply conflicts-of-laws doctrines to lawsuits
involving parties whose primary contacts with a forum and with each other have entirely
been through Internet. Id.
6. See R.R. Jueneman & R.J. Robertson Jr., Biometrics and Digital Signatures in Elec-
tronic Commerce, 38JuluMETRucsJ. 427, 433 n.26 (1998) (defining electronic as term that
does not mean exclusively electrical, but includes other forms of document prepara-
tion, transmission, and storage, including fiber optic transmission lines).
7. See Wu, supra note 2, at 317 (stating that advent of E-Commerce has created
need for new types of practices and suggesting as one possible practice, use of incorpo-
rating documents by reference).
8. See Webster Hypertext Lookup (visited Jan. 15, 1999) <http://work.ucsd.edu:5141/
cgi-bin/http-webster> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (defining au-
thenticity to mean genuineness and quality of not being corrupted from original).
9. SeeJueneman & Robertson, supra note 6, at 434 (citing concerns that conclud-
ing transactions electronically will violate current legislation that requires signed writ-
ing or that electronic documents will not be recognized as evidence in proceedings); see
also id. at 433 n.26 (defining electronic document as digital representation of informa-
tion, where human-readable characters and images have been reduced to set of binary
digits, or bits, which are ones and zeros that represent those characters). The term
electronic document does not refer to a stored or transmitted image of a document,
such as a photographic microfilm copy or a scanned image of a document. Id. The
difference between an electronic document and a written image of the same document
is that the electronic document has captured the raw keystrokes used to create it. Id.
In the case of a written document, the image of the document has been captured. Id.
Electronic documents are normally stored and transmitted in computer-readable form
only. Id.
10. Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 3, at 308; see Brian W. Smith & Timothy E.
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laws that require signed and/or written records in order to cre-
ate a binding legal effect."l Laws that require writings may range
from basic contract requirements, such as the statute of frauds, 1 2
to other more complex provisions, such as notarization a" and at-
testation. 4
Another legally significant question involves the use, recog-
nition, and regulation of digital signatures.' 5 In addition to the
numerous legal requirements for paper documents, the require-
ment to have a handwritten signature can be another obstruc-
tion to E-Commerce because of its effect on digital signatures. 6
Keehan, Digital Signatures: The State of the Art and the Law, 114 BANKING L.J. 506, 511
(1997) (stating that threshold legal question for digital signature is whether it would be
legally acceptable form of signature).
11. See Richard L. Field, Digital Signatures: Verifying Internet Business Transactions,
471 PRACT. L. INST.: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 721, 723 (Mar. 4, 1997) (stating that some laws require that
certain documents must be signed by hand, specifically at bottom of document, and
that original document must be used for official purposes and/or retained for specified
number of years). Some concern exists that business documents might have to be ad-
missible as valid evidence in a court of law. Id. Once admitted, they should have appro-
priate probative value. Id.
12. See id. (describing Statute of Frauds as legal provision that requires that certain
documents must be in writing in order to be enforceable). The Statute of Frauds was
first enacted in England in 1677 and has been incorporated into a number of areas of
U.S. law at the state level. Id. Documents that must be in writing include contracts for
the sale of goods, in excess of US$500, contracts that, by their terms, cannot be com-
pleted within one year, contracts for the sale of land, contracts that guaranty the debts
of another person, agreements made in contemplation of marriage, and certain other
contracts. Id.
13. Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 3, at 308; see Webster Hypertext Lookup, supra
note 8 (defining notarizing as procedure when party authenticates documents).
14. See Jane Kaufman Winn, Open Systems, Free Markets, and Regulation of Internet
Commerce, 72 TUL. L. REv. 1177, 1219 (1998) (describing process of attestation when
notary must determine that signature is that of person appearing before notary). The
normal procedure for a notary to attest the validity of a signature is to have the person,
whose signature will be notarized, appear before the notary. Id. The person must pres-
ent to the notary sufficient evidence that the person is who he or she claims to be. Id.
In the presence of the notary, the person will sign the document and the notary for-
mally witnesses the signature. Id. The notary will affix the notarial seal or stamp and
sign and date the document. Id.
15. See id. at 1198 (defining digital signature as term of art used to denote type of
electronic imprint that has been produced through cryptographic procedure).
16. Randy V. Sabett, International Harmonization in Electronic Commerce & Electronic
Data Interchange: A Proposed First Step Toward Signing on the Digital Dotted Line, 46 AM. U.
L. REv. 511, 528 (1996); see Smith & Keehan, supra note 10, at 511 (arguing that thresh-
old question for digital signatures is if they would be legally acceptable form of signa-
ture under state's statute of frauds provisions). Smith & Keehan argue that without
legal recognition, electronic communications would be enforceable in court. Smith &
Keehan, supra, at 511; see Richard Hill & Ian Walden, The Draft UNCITRAL Model Law for
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Some commentators opine that written signature requirements
are potentially the single greatest obstacle to E-Commerce.
17
Many scholars note that E-Commerce will achieve its full po-
tential only if a modern legal infrastructure exists that supports
the use of digital signatures for business and government trans-
actions. 8 They argue that an appropriate legal framework that
accompanies the use of digital signatures can facilitate E-Com-
merce. 9 Such a legal framework can. exist in a governing body
of law or in private agreements that provide for the enforceabil-
ity of digital signatures.20
Currently, a global legal framework does not exist because
many nations are attempting to ensure the safety and confidenti-
ality of their own E-Commerce transactions individually by enact-
ing separate digital signature laws.2" In August 1997, Germany
and Italy enacted digital signature legislation, while the English,
Swedish, and Dutch governments were simultaneously setting up
task forces to address the creation of their own digital signature
legislation.22 In addition, many U.S. states have recently enacted
Electronic Commerce: Issues and Solutions, 13 No. 3 COMPUTER L.J. 18, 19 (1996) (stating
that even when law does not explicitly disallow digital signatures, case law is not devel-
oped, and many businessmen are justifiably concerned about the how courts will ulti-
mately view electronic signatures).
17. Judith Y. Gliniecki & Ceda G. Ogada, The Legal Acceptance of Electronic Docu-
ments, Writings, Signatures, and Notices in International .Transportation Conventions: A Chal-
lenge in the Age of Global Electronic Commerce, 13 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 117, 134-35 (1992).
18. Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 3, at 308; see ScottJensen, AB 811 Regulates
the Use of Digital Signatures in Wisconsin, 71 Wis. LAw. 23 (1998) (explaining that
although technical communications infrastructure provided by Internet is already in
place, it requires continuous upgrading and expansion to keep pace with exponential
growth in its use). ScottJenson suggests that the legal and commercial infrastructure
necessary to facilitate E-Commerce is less developed. Jensen, supra. Attorneys, business
people, and policy makers are beginning to grapple with issues that need to be resolved
in order for secure and binding E-Commerce transactions to become an everyday expe-
rience. Id.
19. See Sabett, supra note 16, at 526-27 (explaining that existing legal infrastruc-
ture embraces technology that began over 500 years ago). The present day legal infra-
structure relied on paper-based systems and presents a formidable barrier to the full
adoption of electronic means of conducting business. Id..
20. See Robert G. Ballen & Thomas A. Fox, Electronic Banking Products and Services:
The New Legal Issues, 115 BANKING L.J. 334, 339 (1998) (arguing that guidelines must
exist in order to enforce electronic communications, signed with digital signatures, to
make them constitute writing for legal purposes).
21. Kimberly B. Kiefer, Developments Abroad May Influence U.S. Policy on Electronic
Banking, 17 No. 4 BANKING PoL'v REP. 1, 8 (1998).
22. See id. at 8 (stating that in addition to these countries, Malaysia also adopted
digital signature law in September 1997).
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digital signature statutes that legally permit the use of digital sig-
natures.
23
These recent enactments have created state and national
standards for regulating digital signatures that differ and some-
times conflict with one another.24 Some countries have enacted
or proposed laws that require significant state involvement.25
Other countries have been more hesitant in enacting digital sig-
nature regulations and call for flexible standards26 that would be
easier for all countries to recognize mutually and to use.27 More-
over, even where some laws are the same or comparable to one
23. See Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-121 (13) (West 1998) (allowing Arizona Secretary
of State to approve for and use digital signatures for documents filed with and by all
state agencies); CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 16.5 (West 1997) (allowing use of digital signatures
when communicating with public entity); FLA. STAT. ch. 282 § 282.70 et. seq. (West
1997) (setting forth Florida's Electronic Signature Act of 1996 that allows use of digital
signatures for all communications); 1997 GA. CODE ANN. 40-3-21(b). (1997) (allowing
commissioner to authorize use of digital signatures in car transactions); WASH. REV.
CODE. ANN. § 19.34 et seq. (West 1998) (citing Washington Electronic Authentication
Act that allows use of digital signature for all communications); see also Ballen & Fox,
supra note 20, at 340 (stating that Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, and Washing-
ton have recently enacted digital signature statutes that permit use of digital signa-
tures). See generally Kiefer, supra note 21, at 8 (stating that 40 states legislatures are
working on electronic authentication statutes).
24. Kiefer, supra note 21, at 8; see Ira H Parker, Why Digital Signatures Matter, 1
ELEC. BANKING L. & COM. REP. 2 (1997) (explaining current legal scenario with digital
signature legislation as being formulated and debated on so many different levels, and
that these different legislative approaches may raise important issues for those engaged
in E-Commerce). One issue that is raised is that U.S. states bear the risk of varying and
potentially conflicting standards. Id. This risk is compounded when entering the inter-
national arena. Id.
25. See Kiefer, supra note 21, at 9 (stating that Germany and Malaysia have enacted
laws that entail significant governmental licensing and state involvement in digital sig-
nature regulation).
26. See Theodore S. Barassi, International Developments in Digital Signature Legislation,
2 ELEC. BANKING L. & COM. REP. 16 (1997) (describing jurisdictions such as Spain as
having defined digital signature requirements with general provisions). Spain has very
general, non-technically oriented provisions that establish inalterability, integrity, or
uniformity of the signed electronic message. Id. Other jurisdictions have adopted a
more detailed approach that outlines specific requirements for the use of digital signa-
tures. Id.
27. See Kiefer, supra note 21, at 9 (commenting that U.S. President William Clin-
ton's Administration wants internationally uniform regulations for digital signatures).
The U.S. administration desired to pursue federal legislation to standardize the differ-
ing approaches set in place by the different states. Id.; see Mike Nelson, White House
Global Information Infrastructure-Summary of Drafting Panel Discussion (visited Jan. 17,
1999) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/OSTP/forum/html/gii.html> (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal) (stating that only consensus among panel of
representatives from different groups, such as governmental, private, and research ori-
ented bodies, was that effective, inexpensive, standardized global solution was urgently
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another, regulators or the courts may interpret such laws in an
inconsistent manner.2' Due to this conflict of laws, some com-
mentators have suggested that an international digital signature
regime would promote E-Commerce and resolve the current
conflict of laws.2 9 Others have opposed any type of legislation
on digital signatures, arguing that this legislation would lead to
burdensome governmental regulation.3"
This Note addresses the issue of whether all nations should
enact a uniform global legal scheme governing digital signatures
for the purpose of promoting E-Commerce. Part I of this Note
describes digital signatures and considers their different func-
tions. Part I also discusses E-Commerce and the application of
digital signatures to E-Commerce. Further, Part I briefly exam-
ines the major legal schemes set up by organizations, states, na-
tions, and international bodies. Part II analyzes arguments for
and against global digital signature laws in order to facilitate E-
Commerce. Part III argues that nations should adopt a global
digital signature legal scheme in order to promote E-Commerce
by eliminating conflicting laws. This Note concludes that na-
tions should draft and enact a global digital signature legal
scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION TO DIGITAL SIGNATURES
AND E-COMMERCE
A digital signature is a way to send an encoded message to
needed for digital signature). The panel concluded that, otherwise, any of the poten-
tial applications of E-Commerce may not be fully developed. Nelson, supra.
28. See Ballen & Fox, supra note 20, at 340 (stating that some digital signature
statutes are similar, but not exactly uniform among different jurisdictions). A financial
institution seeking to provide electronic banking services on a multi-state basis might
have to comply with potentially conflicting requirements in the different jurisdictions
where it operates. Id. A further danger is that, even if the digital signature statutes are
the same or comparable, they will be interpreted in an inconsistent manner by the
jurisdiction's regulators or the courts. Id.
29. See Sabett, supra note 16, at 511 (opining that these domestic developments
should lead to uniform international standard); see also Kiefer, supra note 21, at 13
(arguing that with current emerging network environment, information and transac-
tions should move freely across national boundaries, and therefore governments should
cooperate and coordinate policies).
30. See Winn, supra note 14, at 1181 (describing state of Internet as rapidly ex-
panding because Internet does not have unresponsive regulatory structure). Winn ar-
gues that no compelling evidence exists that market forces are failing to create a fair
and efficient result for parties. Id.; see Kiefer, supra note 21, at 11 (stating that some
present digital signature legislation is stringent and inflexible).
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another party in an electronic transaction.3 1 Digital signatures
can also facilitate E-Commerce by allowing parties to enter into
binding contracts using the Internet.12 Due to the importance
of digital signatures to E-Commerce transactions, digital signa-
ture legislation is being formulated on individual state, national,
and international levels.33
A. Digital Signatures
Using the process of cryptography,34 a user can create a dig-
ital signature. 35 The digital signature is a string of data that is
created by using asymmetric cryptography ("asymmetric").36
Some commentators have suggested that digital signatures can
serve the same legal function as written signatures.37
31. See Smith & Keehan, supra note 10, at 507 (stating that digital signature is
arcane term for type of encoded message that assures each party in electronic transac-
tions that other parties are who they say they are). Digital signatures also ensure that a
received message is valid because it remains unchanged from the time of delivery. Id.;
see Kiefer, supra note 21, at 1 (explaining digital signatures can be seen as electronic
means of verifying parties that are transacting with one another).
32. See Jenson, supra note 18 (arguing that businesses have migrated to Internet
and that E-Commerce has created new opportunities for banks, merchants, and con-
sumers). Jenson states that digital signatures are an essential element for E-Commerce
because they allow businesses and consumers to sign documents electronically. Id.; see
Smith & Keehan, supra note 10, at 507 (suggesting that digital signatures may be neces-
sary catalyst to spur E-Commerce expansion).
33. See Parker, supra note 24 (describing efforts by U.S. states, U.S. federal govern-
ment, and United Nations).
34. See Winn, supra note 14, at 1198 (describing cryptography as process of taking
some information, which is called the plaintext, and passing this information through
an encryption process to produce encrypted copy of information, which is called
ciphertext). The ciphertext can be decrypted and restored to the original plaintext
through the application of the cipher key ("key"). Id. The key is a special type of
decoder. Id. In general, an encryption system that uses a longer key is better protected
from being broken into by outsiders. Id.
35. See Smith & Keehan, supra note 10, at 507 (stating that digital signature is term
for encoded message that assures each party identity of other party in Internet transac-
tions); Field, supra note 11, at 724 (arguing that digital signatures are an appropriate
solution for E-Commerce problems).
36. See Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 3, at 313 (explaining how asymmetric,
or public key cryptography works).
37. Jenson, supra note 18; see Sabett, supra note 16, at 523 (arguing digital signa-
ture can fulfill legal purposes of written signatures such as proving authenticity and
designation of signer's approval).
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1. Cryptography Principles
Cryptography is the art of communicating in secret code.38
Two main types of cryptography are symmetric ("symmetric")
and asymmetric cryptography.39 Both cryptography systems
work to change one group of symbols, which are readily reada-
ble, into another set of symbols, which are not readily reada-
ble.40 The process of cryptography begins with a sender compos-
ing a message. 4
1
a. Symmetric
Symmetric uses a single secret key42 either to encrypt/trans-
form a message or to decrypt/restore a message to its original
form.43 Two users must possess the same key in order to ex-
change messages and communicate securely with one another."
During the Cold War, the U.S. military used symmetric for com-
38. See Phillip E. Reiman, Cryptography and the First Amendment: The Right to be Un-
heard, 14J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 325, 328 (1996) (comparing process of
cryptography to alphabet). Reiman states that the alphabet is a code that the public
understands. Id. Unlike the open code of the alphabet, cryptography uses secret code
in order to limit access to the contents of a message to a select group. Id.
39. See Winn, supra note 14, at 1199 (stating that symmetric cryptography ("sym-
metric") is also known as conventional or secret key and that asymmetric cryptography
("asymmetric") is also known as public key or dual key).
40. Reiman, supra note 38, at 328.
41. See National Research Council, Computer Science and Telecommunications
Board, Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society 477 (Kenneth W. Dam
& Herbert S. Lin eds., 1996) at 374 [hereinafter "CRISIS Report"] (citing example of
first sender composing message for recipient and then using encryption algorithm,
which is series of mathematical steps, to scramble written message).
42. See Reiman, supra note 38, at 328 (explaining how key will work). Suppose a
code substitutes the original letters of a word with the letters that come two places
earlier, for example Free becomes Gsff. Id. The process of substituting letters is known
as the key. Id.
43. Charles R. Merrill, Proof of Who, What, and VWun in Electronic Commerce Under the
Digital Signature Guidelines, 525 PRAcT. L. INST.: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 129, 133 (June 24, 1998); see William E.
Wyrough, Jr. & Ron Klein, The Electronic Signature Act of 1996: Breaking Down Barriers to
Widespread Electronic Commerce in Florida, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. Rv. 407, 422 (1997) (stating
that computers have ability to make cryptography algorithms complex). Data can be
encrypted using a special type of computer program and then decrypted using the same
or a similar type of program. Wyrough & Klein, supra, at 422.
44. See Randy V. Sabett, PGP: Securing the Privacy of Electronic Information Through
Encryption, 2 No. 6 ELECTRONIC BANKING L. & COMPUTER REP. 13 (1997) (highlighting
importance that both users possess same key in order to communicate through symmet-
ric).
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munication purposes.45 An example of a symmetric algorithm is
the Data Encryption Standard ("DES"), which the U.S. govern-
ment adopted in 1977.46 Currently, DES is the most commonly
used symmetric system.47
The practical weakness of symmetric is keeping the key a
secret.48 Because the sender and recipient must use the same
key in order to encrypt and to decrypt each other's message,
they must transmit the secret key between one another. 49  A
third party can intercept this transmission.5 ° This problem is
compounded if a user wishes to send his secret key to multiple
users.
5 1
b. Asymmetric
Asymmetric or public key cryptography is based on the use
of two different but related keys to encrypt and decrypt
messages. 2 In 1978, Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard
Adleman created a new style of key, the RSA system ("RSA"),
which utilized two keys.5' The sender and recipient of the elec-
45. See Winn, supra note 14, at 1199 (stating that U.S. military used complex logis-
tics in order to utilize symmetric). The military used couriers that were handcuffed to
locked briefcases that contained the key. Id. The couriers did not have the keys either
to the briefcase or the handcuffs. Id.
46. See Federal Information Processing Standard 46, Data Encryption Standard, 48
Fed. Reg. 41,062 (1983) (explaining that Digital Encryption Standard ("DES") was de-
veloped by International Business Machine Corporation); see CRISIS Report, supra note
41, tbl. C1 (stating that DES uses fifty-six bit keys).
47. See Wyrough & Klein, supra note 43, at 422 (stating that experts consider DES
relatively resistant to most types of attack and that DES has been extensively used in
financial environments and military intelligence operations).
48. See Reiman, supra note 38, at 329 (explaining that symmetric systems require
that both sender and recipient know key and that at some point these parties must
exchange unencoded information about key). The communication involving informa-
tion about the key is vulnerable to interception. Id.
49. See Wyrough & Klein, supra note 43, at 422 (stating that if sender and recipient
use open data networks to exchange private keys, then possibility of compromise is
great).
50. See Reiman, supra note 38, at 329 (stating that communication of secret key is
vulnerable to interception).
51. See Sabett, supra note 44 (stating that symmetric suffers from security risk asso-
ciated with distributing same key to all users who need to communicate with one an-
other).
52. Winn, supra note 14, at 1199.
53. See Reiman, supra note 38, at 330 (stating that this system is named after its
inventors and employs logarithmic function to produce two keys). A sender can choose
a specific base number and an exponent to create a key that can be split between en-
crypting and decrypting. Id.
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tronic message would use two mathematically generated keys,
one that is public and one that is private.5 4 RSA is the most com-
monly used method of public key encryption.5 5
With the use of two keys, public key cryptography removes
most of the risks associated with symmetric key distribution.5 6 In
addition, parties that have never even met can use public key
cryptography to send encrypted messages without the need to
exchange private keys.5 7 One commentator argues that public
key cryptography can allow businesses to take advantage of the
economic potential of the Internet.5
8
2. What is a Digital Signature?
Digital signatures are a string of data used as an electronic
means of authenticating parties to a transaction.5 9 Public key
cryptography is the basis for creating digital signatures.6 °
Although a public key corresponds with a private key, a neutral
third party, known as a certification authority, ensures that the
key pair is associated with the sender.6 1
54. See Wyrough & Klein, supra note 43, at 423 (explaining that under this system,
one sender can encrypt message with recipient's public key and that recipient can use
his private key to decrypt sender's message).
55. See Lonnie Eldridge, Internet Commerce and the Meltdown of Certification Authori-
ties: Is the Washington State Solution a Good Model?, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1805, 1812 n.24
(1998) (stating that RSA has been incorporated into variety of technological applica-
tions, including Netscape's Internet Browser).
56. See Sabett, supra note 44 (stating that public key algorithms remove risk associ-
ated with private key distribution because each user can publicize his public key, for use
by others in securing messages to that user).
57. See Wyrough & Klein, supra note 43, at 423 (arguing that public key cryptogra-
phy resolves problems of exchanging private key and that public key cryptography can
routinely make transactions that require secure communications).
58. See Reiman, supra note 38, at 331 (maintaining that because of security issues
with Internet, building any business on Internet is like trying to build banks without
walls). Businesses can use asymmetric systems to protect private communications and
to deliver their products to consumers. Id. at 331-32.
59. See Kiefer, supra note 21, at 9 (stating that digital signature is created through
use of private key); see Smith & Keehan, supra note 10, at 506 (defining digital signature
as electronic encoded message having unique alphanumerical notation). Smith &
Keehan, supra.
60. See Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 3, at 312-14 (stating that public and
private keys make digital signatures possible); see Sabett, supra note 16, at 519-20 (ex-
plaining principles of public key cryptography are manifested in digital signatures be-
cause the structure of public/private key pair also exist in digital signature system).
61. See Smith & Keehan, supra note 10, at 508 (defining certification authority as
neutral third party who issues certificate that is electronic record that represents that
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a. Digital Signature Principles
The term digital signature denotes an electronic imprint
that is produced using cryptography.62 A digital signature is not
a digitized 63 version of a person's handwritten signature, but
rather a transformation or reduction of the text of an electronic
document that is then appended to the document itself.64 Ac-
cordingly, the recipient of a digital signature will not see the
sender's signature on paper or on the computer screen. 65 In-
stead, the digital signature utilizes a unique alphanumerical66
notation that guarantees the level of validity, authenticity,' and
security necessary to conduct electronic transactions.67
b. Creating a Digital Signature with Public Key Cryptography
Digital signatures are based on public key cryptography,68
which involves the use of two codes, also known as keys.6 9 The
signer identified in certificate is holding corresponding private key). The certification
authority digitally signs the certificate and assures its authenticity. Id.
62. Winn, supra note 14, at 1198; see Joseph Altizer, Electronic Signatures Authoriza-
tion Act, W. VA. LAW., Aug. 12, 1998, at 25 (stating that digital signature is transforma-
tion of electronic document into encrypted data using public key cryptography).
63. See Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (visited Dec. 31, 1998) <http://
machaut.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/WEBSTER.sh?WORDDigitize> (on file with the Ford-
ham International Law Journal) (defining digitize as process when computer converts
some information, i.e. signal or image, into form expressible in binary notation).
64. Jueneman & Robertson, supra note 6, at 437-38; see Smith & Keehan, supra
note 10, at 507 (calling term digital signature slight misnomer because it is not manual
or written signature).
65. Smith & Keehan, supra note 10, at 507; seeJueneman & Robertson, supra note
6, at 437-38 (stating that digital signature will be appended to document); see Sabett,
supra note 16, at 521 (explaining that due to mathematical basis of public key cryptog-
raphy, digital signature is stream of digits that is unintelligible to human observer and
that digital signature would not be displayed to. user in commercial implementations).
66. See Merriam Webster VVWW Dictionary (visited Jan. 17, 1999) <http://www.m-
w.com/netdict.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (defining al-
phanumeric as type of text that consists of either letters or numbers or sometimes other
symbols, i.e. punctuation marks and mathematical symbols).
67. Jueneman & Robertson, supra note 6, at 438-40; see Benjamin Wright, Eggs in
Baskets: Distributing the Risks of Electronic Signatures, 452 PRAc. L. INST.: PATENTS, CoPY-
RIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 63, 67 (Sept.
1996) (explaining that digital signature is short unit of data that has mathematical rela-
tionship to data in content of document).
68. See Wright, supra note 67, at 67 (explaining that public key cryptography pro-
vides mathematical scheme for arranging any computer data, from electronic expense
vouchers to medical records, such that its integrity and origin can be proven).
69. See Clayton J. Joffrion, International Law, 45 LA. Bus. J. 279, 279 (1997) (illus-
trating how digital signature technology uses asymmetric cryptosystem to encrypt
message).
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sender uses one key to authenticate the source and content of
his electronic documents and the recipient uses the other key to
validate that the document came from the sender.7 ° In the pub-
lic key cryptography system, each user is assigned two keys, a pri-
vate key and a public key.71 The private key is kept solely in the
possession of the signer of an electronic document and is used
to encrypt the text of the document into the digital signature.7 2
The public key can be freely distributed and used by anyone.73
The public and private keys are mathematically related, but their
relationship is so complicated that it is computationally infeasi-
ble to deduce the private key solely from knowledge of the pub-
lic key.74
Using public key cryptography, digital signature users can
send messages in two ways.75 Under one method, a message
sender can use the recipient's public key to send a message to
the recipient who holds the private key that corresponds to the
70. SeeJueneman & Robertson, supra note 6, at 438 (stating that public and private
keys are generated at same time); see a/soJoffrion, supra note 69, at 279 (stating that one
party uses private key to encrypt message identifying that person). The receiving party
has a public key, which can decode the private key message to identify the sender, but
which can not decode the private key. Joffrion, supra.
71. See Wright, supra note 67, at 67 (explaining that public-key cryptography in-
volves use of two keys, which are special strings of data). The two keys, the public key
and the private key, are assigned to only one user. Id. Public key cryptography provides
a mathematical scheme for arranging computer data through the use of these two keys.
Id. The mathematical scheme is arranged so that the integrity and origin of the digital
signature can be proven. Id. Each of the two keys bears a complex mathematical rela-
tionship to one another. Id.
72. Jueneman & Robertson, supra note 6, at 438; see Smith & Keehan, supra note
10, at 507 (describing private key as part of procedure to encrypt and decrypt informa-
tion because it is one of two input keys). The signer should keep the private key classi-
fied. Smith & Keehan, supra.
73. See Winn, supra note 14, at 1200-01 (explaining that public key can be widely
published and freely distributed without any compromise of private key's security). The
open distribution of the public key allows parties to communicate with one another
without having to find a system to distribute the keys securely. Id. at 1199-1200. Sender
and recipient do not have to be in direct personal contact. Id.
74. Jueneman & Robertson, supra note 6, at 438; see Smith & Keehan, supra note
10, at 507 (describing keys as numerical passwords that are mathematically related, but
computationally infeasible to derive from one another). This characteristic, of not be-
ing able to derive one key from the other, makes it infeasible to create a signed message
that can be verified by application of the public key without a person having knowledge
of the private key. Smith & Keehan, supra. A third party cannot identify and replicate a
person's digital signature. Id.
75. Winn, supra note 14, at 1200.
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public key.76 Using another method, the message sender can
use his private key to encrypt a message and send it to the recipi-
ent, who would decrypt it using the sender's public key. 7 With
this method, the recipient can be certain that the message came
from the sender, whose private key corresponds to the public
key used to decrypt the message.78
The cryptography process begins when a sender wants to
send a message to a recipient.7 In order to create a digital sig-
nature, the sender must have a message to send to recipient.8 0
The sender has an option to run this message through a hash
function,"1 which performs a series of mathematical operations
on the message. 2 The hash function creates a number that is
called a message digest.8 The sender then encodes this message
digest with the recipient's public key and the result is an en-
crypted message.8 4 The message digest, encrypted with the re-
cipient's public key, forms the digital signature for the sender's
message. 5 Next, the sender sends the message to the recipi-
ent. 6 The recipient receives the sender's message and then uses
the recipient's private key to decode it.8 7 During this process,
neither the sender nor the recipient needs to reveal their secret
76. See id. (explaining that with this nethod, sender is assured that nobody else
other than recipient, who holds the private key, will be able to read message content).
77. See Wright, supra note 67, at 67 (stating that sender can use his private key and
cryptography program to attach digital signature to document). The recipient can con-
firm the document's authenticity by using the sender's public key and a cryptography
program. Id.
78. Winn, supra note 14, at 1200.
79. Eldridge, supra note 55, at 1811.
80. See Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 3, at 314 (explaining that electronic
message could range from simple e-mail messages to complicated lengthy contracts).
81. See Eldridge, supra note 55, at 1816 (describing hash functions as process that
takes some message and produces smaller digest or message summary that is usually in
form of single number). This number is unique to the message. Id.
82. Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 3, at 314.
83. See id. (describing message digest as message's fingerprint because slightest
change in message will cause hash function to produce completely different message
digest).
84. See Eldridge, supra note 55, at 1811 (stating that message is encrypted because
message goes through sender's public key, and can only be decrypted by using sender's
private key); Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 3, at 314 n.15 (explaining that
message digest that was created through using hash function ensures integrity of
message's content).
85. Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 3, at 314.
86. Eldridge, supra note 55, at 1811.
87. See id. (stating that during this process, neither sender nor recipient would
need to reveal their secret keys to one another or to anyone else).
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keys to one another or to anyone else.88 This process can work
using different keys.89
c. Public Key Cryptography Security Concerns: The
Development and the Role of the
Certification Authority
Public key cryptography raises several security concerns.9 °
The private key must remain confidential in order to prevent
another party from unauthorized use of the private key.91 An-
other concern is determining whether a public key is truly associ-
ated with the party who claims to be its owner.9 2 If the person
uses an imposter's key, then the imposter will be able to abuse
that party's information."
88. Id.; see Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 3, at 311 (explaining that public
key cryptography eliminates need for different users to share secret keys and that hard-
ware and software that implements this technology shields end users).
89. See Eldridge, supra note 55, at 1815 (explaining how sender can encrypt using
his private key and the recipient could decrypt with sender's public key). For example,
a sender could encode a message using his private key. Id. By encrypting this message,
the sender has produced a digital signature. Id. He could send this encrypted message
to a recipient, who could use the sender's public key to decrypt the sender's message.
Id. This method verifies that only the sender has sent this message because no one
other than the sender can create an encrypted message that can be decrypted by
sender's public key. Id.
90. See Wright, supra note 67, at 68 (assessing security concerns with public key
cryptography, and that one such concern is that person using public/private key pair
might not be proper party but imposter who stole keys). Used alone, public key cryp-
tography does not reduce risk in signing of electronic document. Id.; see Mike Tonsing,
The Digital Certificate Comes of Age, 45 FED. LAw 20 (1998) (describing security problems
of using digital signatures alone). Suppose a lawyer receives an e-mail from his client
for a copy of a privileged letter regarding prospective litigation. Tonsing, supra. The
lawyer sends the letter to the requestor. Id. The requestor might not be the lawyer's
client but an adverse party to the client. Id.
91. Winn, supra note 14, at 1201; see C. Bradford Biddle, Legislating Market Winners:
Digital Signature Laws and the Electronic Commerce Marketplace, 34 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 1225,
1236 (1997) (stating possible results of stolen private keys).
92. Winn, supra note 14, at 1201. See Eldridge, supra note 55, at 1813 (stating that
some third party imposter can replace person's actual public key with different public
key).
93. See Eldridge, supra note 55, at 1813 (describing situation that involves imposter
public keys). Suppose a purchaser went to a merchant's Internet site and wanted to
make a purchase. Id. First, the purchaser would look up the merchant's public key and
then encrypt his credit card number with it. Id. He would send this encrypted message
to the merchant. Id. Only the merchant would be able to read the message because
the merchant would have exclusive use of its private key. Id. Suppose an imposter
replaced the merchant's actual public key with his own key. Id. The purchaser would
encrypt his credit card with the imposter's public key. Id. The imposter would be able
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A public key infrastructure is a potential solution to the
problem of verifying public keys to its true owner.9" This solu-
tion involves the use of a certification authority ("CA"). A CA
is a third party who primarily associates a public key with a par-
ticular individual.96 The CA issues a certificate97 that, in its sim-
plest form, contains a copy of the public key in question and the
identity of the person associated with the key.98 One commenta-
tor has argued that CAs are important to the widespread com-
mercial use and acceptance of digital signatures because CAs ver-
ify the identity of parties.99 The CA may maintain an Internet
directory that will contain certificates for all of its subscribers. 100
3. Parallels Between Written Signature and Digital
Signature Functions
One commentator has argued that without changing the ex-
isting paradigm of a written signature, a digital signature can ful-
to decode the purchaser's message using his private key and steal the purchaser's credit
card number. Id.
94. Winn, supra note 14, at 1201. See Eldridge, supra note 55, at 1813 (stating that
some third party that is trusted can solve problem of impostors by providing reliable
directory of all its subscribers and guaranteeing that listed names and public keys are
correct).
95. See -C. Bradford Biddle, Misplaced Priorities: The Utah Digital Signature Act and
Liability Allocation in a Public Key Infrastructure, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1143, 1150 (1996)
(describing certification authority ("CA") as entity that would check party's identifica-
tion and take other necessary steps to assure itself that the party was indeed who they
claimed); see also A. Michael Froomkin, Symposium: Innovation and the Information Envi-
ronment: The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in Electronic Commerce, 75 OR. L. REv.
49, 55-56 (1996) (explaining certification process).
96. See Smith & Keehan, supra note 10, at 508 (stating that CA is neutral third
party that verifies public keys to make sure that it corresponds with private key and
verifies association between key pair and sender).
97. See Biddle, supra note 95, at 1150 (defining certificates as digitally-signed elec-
tronic documents that attest to connection of public key to individual or other entity).
98. See Winn, supra note 14, at 1202 (stating that certificate may contain copy of
person's identity, his public key, length of time certificate is valid, or any special charac-
teristic that identifies context in which public key will be used); see also Eldridge, supra
note 55, at 1813-14 (stating that certificate could contain subscriber's e-mail address or
other information).
99. See Smith & Keehan, supra note 10, at 508 (positing that CAs are pivotal for
widespread commercial use and acceptance of digital signatures). CAs permit parties
to conduct electronic transactions without having to verify the identity of the other
party independently. Id. Currently, several companies are vying to be CAs. Id.
100. Eldridge, supra note 55, at 1813-14; see id. at 1814 (stating that if private key is
lost or stolen, then CA will provide certificate revocation list that identifies keys that are
no longer valid).
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fill all of the purposes of a written signature.'' Traditionally,
handwritten signatures have served several legal purposes-to
determine authenticity, designate approval, and serve as evi-
dence.' The written signature is the primary means of identify-
ing the signer of a written document.1 0 3 Legal analysts state that
a digital signature can parallel all these purposes by its security,
non-repudiation, 0 4 and evidentiary functions.0 5
a. Security Functions
One legal expert has stated that the digital signature pro-
vides a security function to a user because it promotes integ-
rity"' and authenticity.1" 7 The security function arises not only
from the encryption process to create a digital signature0 8 but
also from the role of a CA to verify the identity of a party. 10 9
Although digital signatures make transactions more secure, they
101. Sabett, supra note 16, at 523; see id. at 515 (stating that digital signatures pro-
vide authenticity through its security functions). Digital signatures can provide a
designation of approval through its non-repudiation function. Id.
102. Id. at 523; see Winn, supra note 14, at 1216 (defining signature as any mark or
symbol that is affixed to writing to manifest the signer's intent to adopt writing and to
be bound by it); Winn, supra note 14, at 1216-18 (listing all types of legally acceptable
signatures).
103. SeeJueneman & Robertson, supra note 6, at 427 (explaining that implicit as-
sumption of why laws require written signature is that written signature identifies signer
and that person's normal signature changes slowly and is very difficult to alter, erase, or
forge without detection).
104. Id.; see Merrill, supra note 43, at 132 (defining non-repudiation as blocking
false denial of both sending message and contents of message).
105. SeeJueneman & Robertson, supra note 6, at 440 (stating that digital signature
can be used as evidence because it has extraordinarily reliable method of validating
content and sender of document).
106. See Hypertext Webster Gateway (visited on Jan. 17, 1999) <http://
work.ucsd.edu:5141/cgi-bin/http_webster?isindex@Integrity&method@exact> (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal) (defining integrity "as state or quality of
being entire or complete; wholeness; entireness; unbroken state"); see also Merrill, supra
note 43, at 132 (referring to integrity as what were contents of message).
107. Sabett, supra note 16, at 515-16 (describing functions of integrity and authen-
tication as security services that digital signatures provide user). Integrity allows
messages to arrive to a recipient intact, but does not provide protection from eaves-
droppers or third parties from intercepting messages. Id. Authentication assures the
recipient that only the sender could have sent the message and is most similar to a
written signature because a written signature can be attributed to its signer. Id.
108. See Smith & Keehan, supra note 10, at 507 (stating that public and private keys
are computationally infeasible to be derived from each other); see also Winn, supra note
14, at 1200 (explaining that if sender uses his real private key in message, then recipient
can only decrypt message by use of sender's public key).
109. See Biddle, supra note 95, at 1150 (describing CA as third party that checks
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do not guarantee confidentiality because other parties can still
intercept messages. 110 While encrypted messages can be inter-
cepted, they cannot be read by third parties because third par-
ties must possess the private key in order to decrypt the
message.11'
Some commentators have stated that an important function
of a digital signature is to ensure integrity of the message be-
cause it verifies the accuracy of a message that has been transmit-
ted via unsecured communications facilities such as the In-
ternet.1 1 2 Through this integrity function, a digital signature en-
sures security by assuring the recipient that the sender's message
arrived intact.11 It also provides integrity by using the hash
function. 4 The hash function creates the message digest,
which prevents a third party from even slightly changing the
message.11 5
Analogous to a handwritten signature, a digital signature
also ensures security by providing authentication. 6 Authentica-
tion, by definition, assures the recipient that only the sender
could have created the message.1 17 One legal analyst has stated
identity of subscribers and posts list of revoked public keys); see also Eldridge, supra note
55, at 1813 (stating that CAs reduce risk of imposters defrauding parties).
110. See Sabett, supra note 16, at 515 (stating that another party can still intercept
message because message is transmitted in public through the Internet).
111. See Juan Carlos Cruellas et al., EDI and Digital Signatures for Business to Business
Electronic Commerce, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 497, 503 (1998) (explaining that any type of
message encrypted with either public or private key can only be verified or decrypted by
other key). If a sender encrypts a message with the public key of the recipient, then
only the private key of the recipient can decrypt the message. Id.
112. Field, supra note 11, at 724; see Urbaczewski et al., supra note 3 (stating that
Internet is open and public network because it allows access to any user who uses same
protocols).
113. Sabett, supra note 16, at 515.
114. Id. at 522; see id. at 523 (defining three characteristics of hash functions).
First, a hash function must be computationally infeasible to derive another meaningful
message that would result in the same message digest. Id. Second, it must be computa-
tionally infeasible to derive the original message from the hash value. Id. Third, the
same results will occur for a given message and algorithm. Id.
115. See Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 3, at 314 (explaining that hash func-
tion is type of program that performs series of mathematical operations on message in
order to create message digest number and that any change to message will create dif-
ferent number).
116. SeeJueneman & Robertson, supra note 6, at 427 (explaining that written sig-
nature is traditional and accepted means for party to identify himself as signer of writ-
ten document). Authentication enables secure transactions because it allows a party to
know that it is dealing with the appropriate counter-party. Id.
117. See Field, supra note 11, at 724 (stating that digital signatures can authenticate
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that a digital signature can go beyond the traditional role of au-
thentication and even become a facilitator of international E-
Commerce."1 8 While a paper-based signature exists and authen-
ticates either the last page or every page, if every page is ini-
tialed, a digital signature provides authentication for every char-
acter within the message.' 9 The authentication function of digi-
tal signatures can eliminate the need for face-to-face meetings
necessary for the signing of documents."z Digital signatures en-
able parties to prove their identities without ever having to
meet.1
2 1
b. Non-repudiation Function
Some commentators have suggested that a digital signature
serves to protect the recipient from repudiation by the sender.
122
This function ensures the recipient that the sender of the
message cannot later deny having sent the message to the recipi-
ent.123 A recipient could prove the sender's authorship by using
accuracy of message that has been transmitted through Internet). The CA can both
authenticate the public key of a party and allocate risk of error or fraud. Id.
118. See Sabett, supra note 16, at 521 (stating that since digital signatures utilize
sophisticated mathematical techniques, they provide security services to international E-
Commerce). Sabett argues that a digital signature most importantly provides authenti-
cation for E-Commerce. Id.
119. Id.; see A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper
Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 709, 895 (1995) (stating that digital signa-
ture can be compared to initializing every character in message because even if message
is slightly altered, message will not properly decrypt).
120. See Sabett, supra note 16, at 516 (explaining that ability to prove one's identity
over great distances, without ever having met other party, can significantly increase
viability of widespread E-Commerce). Sabett argues that face-to-face meetings that are
required for the signing of documents will not be necessary with digital signatures. Id.
The ceremonial aspects of signing a document will still exist; the method by which this
function occurs, however, will shift from paper to electronic. Id. at 517.
121. See id. at 516 (opining that digital signature can increase viability of wide-
spread E-Commerce because personal meetings, usually done to establish party's iden-
tity, are no longer needed); Biddle, supra note 91, at 1241 (stating that notion of iden-
tity is subtle concept whose nuances go to very core of human social and economic
interaction).
122. Field, supra note 11, at 724; see Merrill, supra note 43, at 133 (explaining that
non-repudiation contemplates that sender and recipient are on opposing sides of dis-
pute). Merrill argues that non-repudiation is different from integrity and authentica-
tion because with integrity and authentication, the sender and the recipient are on the
same side of the issue. Merrill, supra. The sender and the recipient work together to
defend and to support the authenticity and integrity of a message and to prevent impos-
ters or third parties from tampering with the message. Id.
123. Sabett, supra note 16, at 516; see Merrill, supra note 43, at 133 (describing
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the sender's public key in combination with the message. 12 4 A
digital signature strongly supports the function of non-repudia-
tion because it is computationally unfeasible to determine the
private key from the public key.125
c. Evidentiary Function
Finally, some experts suggest that digital signatures also
serve an evidentiary function. 126 The digital signature provides
reliable evidence because the received message is produced by
the sender and is unchanged from the time of delivery. 1 27 The
digital signature also provides reliable algorithmic evidence of
the source of an electronically based document. 128 Experts fur-
ther state that in order for digital signatures to serve as reliable
evidence, the two important conditions, that the private key is
kept secret and a CA is used, are met. 1 29
Besides evidencing the source of a message, a digital signa-
situation where non-repudiation can be issue occurring when recipient attempts to de-
fend and to support authenticity and integrity of sender's message as legally binding).
The sender is attempting to repudiate his legal responsibility of the message or its con-
tents and tries to prove that a third party sent the message. Merrill, supra.
124. See Sabett, supra note 16, at 522 (verifying digital signature with sender's pub-
lic key, recipient has proof that only holder of corresponding private key could have
created original message).
125. See Merrill, supra note 43, at 134 (stating that because of unfeasibility to de-
rive private key from public key, any compromise of public key can only occur by per-
son authorized to hold or have knowledge of private key).
126. Jueneman & Robertson, supra note 6, at 437; see id. at 440 (explaining that
typical message digest is 160 bits in length and therefore some third party has to go
through one trillion trillion messages in order to create identical message digest and
therefore tamper with message). Due to this patent impossibility, the digital signature
becomes irrefutable evidence that the only holder of the private key could have sent the
message. Id.
127. Smith & Keehan, supra note 10, at 507; seeJueneman & Robertson, supra note
6, at 440 (clarifying conclusion that digital signature can serve as reliable evidence if
identity of entity associated with public key is verified by CA and subscriber has pre-
vented loss or compromise of private key). With these two assumptions satisfied, digital
signatures are an extraordinarily reliable method of validating both the originator and
the content of an electronic document. Jueneman & Robertson, supra.
128. SeeJueneman & Robertson, supra note 6, at 438 (stating that digital signature
algorithm is based on use of public and private keys and that these keys allow digital
signatures created by one key to be only decrypted by other key). A document that has
the digital signature, which is verified by the public key, is proof that a person possess-
ing the private key signed it. Id.
129. See id. (explaining that party with private key must maintain secrecy and con-
trol over this key and that party depending on evidence must use reliable means of
verifying identity of party with whom private key is associated).
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ture is evinces that an electronic document has not been tam-
pered with since it was sent.130 The digital signature itself is a
reduced encoding of the document.13 1 If in the slightest way a
document with a digital signature is altered, then the public key
will fail to verify the digital signature. 132 The inability of a public
key to verify the digital signature provides conclusive evidence to
the recipient that the document has been altered since it was
digitally signed.133
B. E-Commerce
Some experts state that E-Commerce is transforming the
global economy by altering the operation of businesses.1
3 1
Although E-Commerce is opening up new business opportuni-
ties,, E-Commerce has several problems. 35 Some commentators
argue that digital signatures are an appropriate solution for
many of these E-Commerce problems. 1 6 The uses of digital sig-
natures in E-Commerce transactions can correlate directly to the
growth and development of the Internet.137
1. Principles of E-Commerce
The explosion of the Internet as a vehicle for consumers has
made E-Commerce a current and popular topic among business
circles and in newspapers. 138 Some commentators have argued
130. Id.; see Kiefer, supra note 21, at 9 (stating that process of verifying digital
signature can reveal even smallest of changes in data).
131. Jueneman & Robertson, supra note 6, at 438.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 3, at 308; seeJensen, supra note 18 (stat-
ing E-Commerce revolution has spurred airlines to offer discount fare packages to con-
sumers through Internet, banks to provide their customers with bank-at-home services,
and merchants to allow consumers to shop for their goods and services on Internet).
135. See Urbaczewski et al., supra note 3 (explaining that E-Commerce transactions
by themselves are not secure from actions by malicious third parties and that E-Com-
merce practices may not meet current legal and regulatory schemes).
136. Field, supra note 11, at 724; see Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 3, at 314
(stating that due to public key cryptography, digital signatures allow people and busi-
ness to conduct confidential transactions over open networks). Digital signatures can
enable the use of Internet systems to perform any transaction, especially transactions
dealing with sensitive or official information. Greenwood & Campbell, supra.
137. Kiefer, supra note at 21, at 8.
138. Urbaczewski et al., supra note 3; see Jerry Ackerman, Getting Fish On Line once
Confined to Auction Rooms, the N.E. Industry Catches the E-Commerce Wave, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 13, 1999, at Cl (reporting that New England fisheries industry have shed their low
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that the current trend of E-Commerce will cause an increase in
the international trade of goods and services.139 Current inves-
tors seek public stock offerings of Internet-related companies,
particularly those engaged in E-Commerce activities.14 ° Some
experts even suggest that certain corporations are involved or
are becoming involved in E-Commerce without having a clear
understanding of the reasons to engage in such transactions."4
Other commentators suggest that E-Commerce needs greater
regulation and oversight.1 4 2 Currently, even policymakers have
been focusing on regulating E-Commerce because of the emer-
technology reputation by putting E-Commerce and information technology to work for
their needs). These fisheries are using a computer system that delivers market quotes
on fish, through the Internet, to computers anywhere in the world. Ackerman, supra, at
Cl; see India: E-Commerce Could Upset Tax Concepts, THE HINDU, Jan. 7, 1999 (reporting
that popular use of E-Commerce can upset existing direct and indirect tax principles).
Foreign vendors can sell products to another country, without establishing a physical
presence in that country, and can avoid local source taxation. India: E-Commerce Could
Upset Tax Concepts, supra.
139. Don Macleod, From the Editor... Virtual Jurisdiction, 2 No. 8 INTERNET LEGAL
RESEARCHER 2, (1997); see Jennifer Conovitz, A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce,
1075 PRAc. L. INST.: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 11, 13 (Sept. 1998) (stating that Internet technology is mak-
ing profound effect on global trade in services and certain goods). Conovitz estimates
that current world trade involving computer software, entertainment products, infor-
mation, and professional services account for over US$40 billion of U.S. exports alone.
Conovitz, supra.
140. See Dunstan Prial, Bounty of Internet IPOs in U.S. Present a Few Pros Among'. coms,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1999, at 20 (stating that U.S. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission has received many initial public offering applications from companies whose
names end with .com and are related to Internet). Prial also suggests that Price-
line.com, Inc. is an example of a corporation that engages in E-Commerce and is ex-
pected to be another promising public stock offering. Id. Priceline.com is managed by
Richard Braddock, former president of Citicorp, and has been backed by Microsoft
Corporation's co-founder Paul Allen. Id.
141. See Richard Blackwell, E-Commerce Strategies Unclear: Report, NAT'L POST, Sept.
10, 1998, at 8 (stating that some financial service institutions are putting more re-
sources into E-Commerce initiatives without proper planning or vision on how E-Com-
merce will increase profit). Blackwell suggests that some banks are allocating resources
to E-Commerce plans only because they are just following their competitors. Id. Fif-
teen Canadian financial institutions that were surveyed spend, on average, nine percent
of their information technology budget on E-Commerce, compared to the three per-
cent average of financial institutions as a whole. Id.
142. See Meg Fletcher, Electronic Commerce Needs Regulators' Attention: Survey, Bus.
INs., Jan. 4, 1999, at 21 (reporting that National Association of Insurance Commission-
ers conducted online survey in which members voiced that state insurance regulators
must continue to identify and overcome existing E-Commerce barriers for insurance
industry).
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gence of its use through the Internet.1 4
The current discussion on E-Commerce underlies existence
of E-Commerce, which has been in use for many years. 144 Some
commentators have suggested that early organizations that used
telephones and telegraphs to communicate with one another en-
gaged in E-Commerce. 4 5 In the 1950s, businesses increasingly
began to use computers and this emergence of computer use
opened new opportunities for commercial applications.146 Then
in 1969, the U.S. Department of Defense created the Internet as
a project to facilitate the exchange of information among educa-
tional institutions and governmental agencies. 4 7 The Internet
has since become a universal appliance for every day life and has
become accessible from almost anywhere in the world.4 E-
Commerce needs a communication network to support it, so the
evolution of the Internet has caused the present increase in E-
Commerce transactions.
1 49
Although the Internet may seem to have limitless potential,
especially in the area of E-Commerce, some experts have noted
that the use of the Internet for E-Commerce has some
143. Urbaczewski et al., supra note 3; see Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 7, at
307-08 (stating that growth of E-Commerce affects every sector of economy and this
growth has attracted attention of policy makers). Greenwood & Campbell argue that
these policy makers believe that E-Commerce can achieve its full potential if a modem
legal infrastructure supports the use of online services for business and government
transactions. Greenwood & Campbell, supra, at 308.
144. See Urbaczewski et al., supra note 3 (stating that E-Commerce has already
been in use through different technologies, such as automated teller machine transfers,
e-mail, fax, interactive telephone, telegraph, and telex).
145. Id.
146. See id. (explaining that computers assist business in numerous ways, such as
freeing time for business manager to strategize for new products and markets, to expe-
dite communication process, to clear geographic hurdles, and to allow rapid globaliza-
tion of businesses).
147. See Gaumer, supra note 5, at 503 (stating that Internet exists because millions
of separate computer operators decided to use common protocols to exchange commu-
nications and information with other computers).
148. See Conovitz, supra note 139, at 13 (stating that Internet used to be solely
reserved for scientific and academic exchange, but. is now being used by people for
different purposes, one of which is to reinvent government because Internet is becom-
ing outlet for personal and political expression). Conovitz also states that businesses
are participating in the Internet and are developing new models of consumer interac-
tion. Id. Entrepreneurs can easily start new enterprises because they use the Internet's
worldwide network of consumers and have lower start up costs. Id.
149. See Urbaczewski et al., supra note 3 (stating that E-Commerce is nothing with-
out communications network to support it and that evolution of Internet has shaped
present growth of E-Commerce).
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problems.15 ° E-Commerce transactions take place over the In-
ternet, which is an open and unsecure network, and thus an-
other party can intercept the information in these transac-
tions. 151 Another problem for E-Commerce is that the Internet
infrastructure needs to develop and grow to accommodate the
increased amount of online users. 152
2. Uses of Digital Signatures in E-Commerce
Experts suggest that digital signatures may be the catalyst
necessary to, spur the expansion of E-Commerce.153 Digital sig-
natures can be used as an electronic means of authenticating the
identities of parties to a transaction.1 54 The use of digital signa-
tures can correlate directly to the growth and development of
the Internet.1 55 One group has stated that the Internet is a novel
business environment because it is an open, global network of
computers.1 56 The Internet has grown rapidly since its incep-
150. See James Hill, Lock and Load Document Security on the Net, Bus. L. TODAY, Dec.
8, 1998, at 8 (stating that one problem of Internet is that it has significant amount of
crime). A potential exists for greater incidents of civil fraud on the Internet. Id.
151. See R.J. RobertsonJr., Electronic Commerce on the Internet and the Statute of Frauds,
49 S.C. L. REv. 787, 796 (1998) (explaining that messages sent through Internet are not
sent over one pathway, but transmitted over series of thousands of networks and can be
read by third parties). A message must move, using intermediary packet switching
nodes, from one network to another before reaching its final goal. Id. Any person with
access to any intermediate node can alter, read, or intercept a message in a way that is
undetectable by the recipient. Id.
152. See Urbaczewski et al., supra note 3 (explaining that when amount of user
traffic exceeds bandwidth of particular network, network becomes very slow as amount
of messages queue up to be delivered through network lines). The commentator states
that currently less than one percent of world's population is connected to the Internet.
Id. If an additional ten percent became connected, then the Internet infrastructure
could collapse. Id. E-Commerce would also become slowed or even die out. Id.
153. Smith & Keehan, supra note 10, at 507..
154. See Field, supra note 11, at 724 (stating that digital signatures can be used to
authenticate accuracy of message and can also authenticate sender of message).
155. Kiefer, supra note 21, at 8.
156. See Winn, supra note 14, at 1183 (explaining how Internet is open in four
ways). The National Research Council has noted that the Internet is open in at least
four ways. Id. First, the Internet is open to all users because it does not force users into
closed groups or deny access to any group in society. Id. Second, it is open to service
providers because it allows an open and accessible environment for competing com-
mercial interests. Id. Third, it is open to network providers because any network pro-
vider can satisfy the necessary requirements to attach and to become part of the aggre-
gate of interconnected networks. Id. Fourth, it is open to change because it constantly
permits the introduction of new applications, services, and technologies and is not lim-
ited to only one application, for example television. Id.
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tion, both in terms of computer capability and the number of
Internet users.157 The U.S. government has asserted that elec-
tronic networks, like the Internet, allow people to transcend bar-
riers of time and distance to take advantage of global markets
and business opportunities and to open a new world of eco-
nomic possibility and progress.1 58  Currently, many businesses
are starting to capitalize on the Internet and are conducting E-
Commerce transactions.1 59 The banking industry is an example
of an area where digital signatures are being used to process E-
Commerce transactions. 1
60
Besides being used by the banking industry, commentators
agree that digital signatures can be utilized in any situation with
any two parties that wish to contract.161 For example, this tech-
nology could be used to close a business deal1 62 or to conduct
any type of official or sensitive transaction otherwise done on
157. See id. at 1187 (citing statistics relating to Internet growth). The number of
host computers-those that relay communications and store data-increased from
about 300 in 1981 to approximately 9.4 million by 1996. Id. About 40 million people
used the Internet in 1996, a number that is expected to mushroom to 200 million by
1999. Id.
158. See President William J. Clinton & Vice-President Al Gore, Jr., A Framework for
Global Electronic Commerce, July 1, 1997 (visited Feb. 6, 1999) <http://www.iitf.nist.gov/
eleccomm/ecomm.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (stating
that United States is on verge of revolution with Internet). Electronic networks allow
people to transcend time and distance barriers to take advantage of global markets and
business opportunities not even imaginable today, opening up a new world of eco-
nomic possibility and progress. Id..
159. See Gaumer, supra note 5, at 503 (stating that businesses are not only advertis-
ing on Internet, but also are using digital signatures to consummate E-Commerce trans-
actions). The Home Shopping Network, Inc. has created an Internet Shopping Net-
work. Id. Companies such as Ford, Wal-Mart, Merrill Lynch, Pizza Hut, Xerox, J.P.
Morgan, General Electric, JC Penny, and Target have used the Internet to reach cus-
tomers and do business with them. Id.
160. See Smith & Keehan, supra note 10, at 506 (stating one application of digital
signatures is by some large and small financial institutions that have introduced home
banking services to their customers). These services offer an array of personal conve-
niences such as inquiring account information, applying for credit card, paying bills,
transferring funds between different accounts, and purchasing one or more of the insti-
tution's deposit and non-deposit products. Id. Smith and Keehan have predicted the
widespread use of Internet banking by the year 2000. Id.
161. Winn, supra note 14, at 1207; see Merry Mayer, USPS to Use PKI to Offer Elec-
tronic Postage, NEWSBvrEs, Sept. 10, 1998 (reporting that U.S. Postal Service ("USPS")
will use public key infrastructure services in order to sell postage over Internet). The
USPS's public key infrastructure will ensure secure transaction for online buyers. Id.
162. See Sabett, supra note 16, at 512-13 (using hypothetical that two businesses,
which are located in different countries, may conduct complex deals by using digital
signatures).
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paper. 163 By using digital signatures, the Internet can be used as
a means of communication between any type of party that wants
to enter into contracts with any other type of party.164 Because
the Internet is unsecure, parties without a pre-existing business
relationship will be more reluctant to enter into contracts
through the Internet than will parties who are familiar with one
another.'65 Digital signatures allow all people and businesses to
use the Internet fully for E-Commerce.' 66
C. Present Legal Digital Signature Schemes
Many localities, nations, and global organizations have en-
acted or are considering the enactment of laws governing the
use of digital signatures.167 Some of these laws address the many
legal and technical issues surrounding digital signatures differ-
ently than others.'68 A brief discussion of some of the major dig-
ital signature legal schemes can provide useful background in-
formation with respect to the question of whether all nations
should adopt a global digital signature scheme.
1. U.S. Initiatives Regarding Digital Signatures
Commentators state that traditionally in the United States,
issues of enforceability and authenticity of signatures and agree-
163. See Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 3, at 314-15 (giving examples of trans-
action that can be done through Internet, such as sending and receiving tax returns,
making purchase orders, sending mortgage applications, or applying for and accepting
credit card applications).
164. Winn, supra note 14, at 1207.
165. See id. (discussing problems of interaction between unknown parties). Parties
with a pre-existing business relationship can create authentication procedures that
build on their own existing policies and procedures. Id. Parties soliciting new business
over the Internet have bigger security concerns that are harder to resolve because they
are not accustomed to dealing with one another. Id.
166. See Field, supra note 11, at 724 (stating that public key cryptography, upon
which digital signatures are based, gives parties high degree of certainty that their com-
munications are confidential, authentic, and accurate). These characteristics of digital
signatures are needed in order to conduct business transactions in an open environ-
ment like the Internet. Id. This level of security is far greater than the security provided
by a written signature. Id.
167. See Barassi, supra note 26 (stating that there is high level of United States and
non-U.S. legislative activity in recognizing digital signature use).
168. See Kiefer, supra note 21, at 9 (discussing different types of state intervention
for enacted digital signature laws). Nations such as Germany and Malaysia have en-
acted laws that call for a heavy state role in the licensing of certification authorities. Id.
The U.S. state of Utah enacted a law that does not involve heavy government regula-
tion. Id.
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ments are primarily governed by state and not federal law.169 It
follows that a number of states have placed their faith in digital
signature technology and have adopted laws that recognize and
regulate the use of digital signatures.170 For example, Utah was
the first jurisdiction to enact legislation regulating digital signa-
tures.17 1 Utah received assistance from the American Bar Associ-
ation's 172 ("ABA") Information Security Committee 173 ("Com-
mittee"), which was the first organization that attempted to deal
with digital signature issues systematically. 17
4
a. The ABA Digital Signature Guidelines
The ABA created the ABA Digital Signature Guidelines
("Guidelines") because no legal precedents existed governing
169. See Ballen & Fox, supra note 20, at 339 (stating that because U.S. states legis-
late directly on signatures, different initiatives are underway in U.S. states to provide
greater degree of legal certainty and predictability with respect to digital signatures).
170. See TEX. GOv'T CODE ANN. § 403.027 (West 1997) (setting forth Texas law that
allows use of digital signatures, but is limited to transactions with Texas State Comptrol-
ler or between Public Agencies); see also VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-467-469 (Michie 1997)
(amended 1998) (setting forth Virginia law that allows use of digital signatures and is
applicable for all communication). See generally Kiefer, supra note 21, at 1 (stating that
some states have enacted digital signature legislation and more than 40 state legisla-
tures have begun to work on electronic authentication laws); McBride, Baker, Coles,
Scope of Authorization to use of Electronic Signature in Enacted Legislation (visited Jan. 17,
1999) <http://www.mbc.com/ds sum.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal) (giving summary of enacted digital signature statutes).
171. See UTAH CODE. ANN § 46-3 (1995) (setting forth Utah Digital Signature Act
that authorizes digital signature use for all communications); see Maureen S. Dorney,
Digital Signature Legislation, 491 PRAGTICE L. INST.: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS,
AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 141, 157 (Sept. 1997) (stating that in
May 1995 Utah enacted comprehensive legal framework for digital signatures to allow
for their widespread use and adoption in E-Commerce).
172. See American Bar Association Profile Page (visited Jan. 16, 1999) <http://
www.abanet.org/media/overview/pintro.html> (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal) (describing American Bar Association ("ABA") as national organization of
legal profession in United States). The ABA is composed principally of court adminis-
trators, business executives, government officials, judges, lawyers, and law professors.
Id.
173. See Information Security Committee Home Page (visited Jan. 17, 1999) <http://
www.abanet.org/scitech/ec/isc/home.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal) (explaining purpose of Information Security Committee). Since 1992, the In-
formation Security Committee ("Committee") has been the source of E-Commerce
legal initiatives. Id. The Committee deals with current computer security issues includ-
ing cryptology, public key infrastructure, risk analysis, and the legal efficacy of secure
digital commerce. Id.
174. Winn, supra note 14, at 1239; see Dorney, supra note 171, at 157 (stating that
several members of Committee even drafted sample digital signature statute for Utah
legislature).
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the use of digital signatures. 175 The Guidelines are general state-
ments of principles. 176 Ultimately, the substantive rules of the
Guidelines establish interrelated legal duties for CAs, parties us-
ing CAs, and any person relying on digital signature certifi-
cates. 177.
i. Legislative History and Purpose of the ABA Guidelines
Prior to the ABA's work on digital signature laws, the ABA
was defining the legal boundaries of E-Commerce. 17' This study
examined the effects of E-Commerce upon fundamental princi-
ples of contract law and related legal issues and led to the devel-
opment of a Model Electronic Data Interchange Trading Part-
ner Agreement and Commentary ("Model TPA") .179 Although
the Model TPA did not change the paradigm in requiring a sig-
nature, it allowed the parties considerable flexibility in defining
what type of signature is acceptable.180
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, businesses began to
recognize the potential for using public key cryptography in
commercial transactions.'18 No legal precedents existed regard-
ing transactions using a public key infrastructure. 8 2 Due to the
absence of any established legal guidelines, the Committee set
out to address this problem and eventually drafted the Guide-
lines. 8 ' In 1992, the Committee began work on a project that
175. Winn, supra note 14, at 1240.
176. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES: LEGAL INFRA-
STRUCTURE FOR CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES AND SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, 20
(1996) [hereinafter GUIDELINES] (stating Guidelines are intended as "a common frame-
work of unifying principles that may serve as a common basis for more precise rules in
various legal systems").
177. Id. at 18.
178. Sabett, supra note 16, at 531; see Michael S. Baum et al., Model Electronic Data
Interchange Trading Partner Agreement and Commentary, 45 Bus. LAw 1645, 1718 (1990)
(explaining that in 1987, Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, under auspices of
ABA, began study on E-Commerce regulation, which was in response to absence of
clear legal guidance regarding E-Commerce).
179. Baum et al., supra note 178, at 1718.
180. Id. at 1731; see Sabett, supra note 16, at 531 (noting that existing technology,
sophistication of parties, and applicable standards must be taken into consideration
when deciding which digital signature, technology to use).
181. Winn, supra note 14, at 1240.
182. See id. (arguing that this lack of legal guidance had chilling effect on develop-
ment of commercial applications of public key cryptography because users could not
build business models involving digital signatures).
183. Id.
1999] PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OFE-COMMERCE 1029
culminated in the 1996 creation of the final version of the
Guidelines.184 A large number of attorneys and technologists
drafted the Guidelines.'85 These drafters were familiar with pub-
lic key cryptography and realized that the potential commercial
utilization of this technology would take place only when some
of the legal uncertainty surrounding its implementation had
been resolved.1 8 6
ii. Substantive Provisions of the Guidelines
The Guidelines do not purport to be a model law.187 In-
stead, the Guidelines offer general statements of principle re-
garding the development of public key infrastructures, with the
intent of influencing the development of more exact rules
within various legal systems.' 88 The Guidelines have been influ-
ential in the United States and in the international development
of public key infrastructure thinking. 8 9 The Guidelines have
also formed the basis for digital signature legislation in a
number of U.S. states.
1 90
The drafters of the Guidelines had several objectives in at-
tempting to eliminate the uncertainty involving the use of digital
signatures.9 One of the objectives was to create a legal frame-
work within which risks of potential liability to digital signature
184. Field, supra note 11, at 725.
185. Winn, supra note 14, at 1240.
186. Id.
187. See Guidelines, supra note 176, at 19-20 (stating that ABA Guidelines are not
intended for adoption as text for statute or regulation because they are not suitable for
that purpose). The Guidelines recommend that legislators should resolve issues left
open in the Guidelines by implementing a digital signature legal and institutional infra-
structure for digital signatures. Id.
188. See id. at 19 (stating that Guidelines are general statements of principle).
They are intended as a common framework of unifying principles that can serve as a
common basis for precise rules for other legal systems. Id..
189. Field, supra note 11, at 725.
190. See id. (stating that Utah was first state to pass law authorizing use of digital
signatures in commerce in UTAm CODE ANN. § 46-3-102 (1995)). The Utah legislation
makes extensive references to the Guidelines. Id.
191. See Guidelines, supra note 176, at 18 (stating that Guidelines seek to establish
safe harbor for use of digital signatures). The drafters of the Guidelines wanted to
create a secure computer-based signature equivalent in order to accomplish four goals.
Id. They sought to minimize incidence of electronic forgeries, to foster reliable authen-
tication of documents in computer form, to facilitate commerce by means of computer-
ized communications, and to give legal effect to technical standards for authentication
of computerized messages. Id.
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developers could be kept within tolerable limits. 19 2 The drafters
of the Guidelines also attempted to set forth the type of legal
infrastructure needed for a system in which third parties could
act as CAs.9
Under the Guidelines, a CA must disclose digital signature
certificates and provide available information regarding the rev-
ocation of certificates to relying parties.'9 4 When deciding to is-
sue a digital signature certificate, CAs must screen the online
identity of the certificate's recipient.'95 The Guidelines do not
instruct the CA on how to make the decision to issue a certificate
beyond requiring that it disclose in its certification practice state-
ment the procedures that it will follow.' 9 6 The Guidelines also
fail to mention any active monitoring by the CA of the continued
validity of any of the information provided by a certificate's re-
cipient.1 97 According to the Guidelines, a CA must maintain a
trustworthy system' 98 and guarantee that its employees and con-
tractors support the system's maintenance. 99 The certificate's
recipient must safeguard the private key that corresponds to the
public key in the certificate. z°
192. See id. (requiring developers to use X.509 directory standard and certain pat-
ented encryption technology in order to get benefits of this reduced liability). Winn,
supra note 15, at 1241.
193. Winn, supra note 14, at 1241-42.
194. See Guidelines, supra note 176, § 3.12 (stating that CAs must promptly publish
notice of suspension or revocation if certificate was published and must disclose fact of
suspension or revocation on inquiry by relying party); see also id. § 1.27 (defining rely-
ing party as "person who has received a certificate and a digital signature verifiable with
reference to a public key listed in the certificate, and is in a position to rely on them");
Winn, supra note 15, at 1241-42.
195. See Guidelines, supra note 176, § 3.7 (listing representations in certificate); see
Comment to Guidelines 3.7.1 (stating that § 3.7 does not require CA to guarantee or
underwrite factual accuracy of confirmed information). The Comment to the Guide-
lines ("Comment") suggests that the level of investigation required can vary. Id. § 3.7.1.
196. See Guidelines, supra note 176, § 3.2 (listing disclosure requirements).
197. See id. § 3.11 (describing when CA should revoke or suspend without consent
of subscriber).
198. See id. § 1.35 (defining trustworthy systems as when all computer hardware,
software, and procedure must be "reasonably secure from intrusion and misuse; pro-
vide a reasonably reliable level of availability, reliability, and correct operation; are rea-
sonably suited to performing their intended functions; and adhere to generally ac-
cepted security principle"); see also id. § 3.1 (stating that CA must have trustworthy sys-
tems).
199. See id. § 3.4 (stating that "CA must formulate and follow personnel practices
which provide reasonable assurance that the trustworthy system of the CA is supported
by the performance of duties of employees and contractors on behalf of the CA").
200. See id. § 4.3 (stating that "during the operational period of a valid certificate,
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The Guidelines provide that if a CA has complied with these
rules, then it is not liable for any losses incurred by a sub-
scriber2 °1 or by a relying party.2 °2 This limit on the CA's poten-
tial liability is a risk allocation rule.2 13 The Guidelines' drafters
introduced this type of liability allocation scheme because they
were concerned that courts might entertain the claims of sub-
scribers or relying parties against CAs.2°4 In addition, the lack of
legal precedent regarding the duties of CAs created an undesir-
able ambiguity from the point of view of potential CAs.2 °5
Although the Guidelines reduce some ambiguity for parties
and developers interested in digital signatures by providing a
legal framework, one commentator suggests that the Guidelines
are vague in certain areas because they do not offer parties clear
definitions. 20 6 Another vague issue is the legal capacity of parties
entering into a contract.20 7 Also, the Guidelines do not offer
the subscriber shall not compromise the private key corresponding to a public key
listed in certificate, and must also avoid compromise during any period of suspension");
see Comment, supra note 195, 4.3.2 (stating that standard of care for safeguarding of
private key should be higher than standard of care imposed by federal law on credit
card or Automatic Teller Machine cardholders).
201. See Guidelines, supra 176, § 1.31 (defining subscriber as person who "is the
subject named or identified in a certificate issued to such person and holds a private
key that corresponds to a public key listed in that certificate").
202. See id. § 3.14 (listing all types of liability from which CA is free if CAcomplies
with the Guidelines).
203. See Winn, supra note 14, at 1242 (stating that this provision excludes any lia-
bility that CA assumes unless it has expressly assumes more risk in its certification prac-
tice statement); see also Comment, supra note 195, 1.8.2 (elaborating that certification
practice statement may contain duties of CA to relying person).
204. See Winn, supra note 14, at 1242 (explaining that drafters feared that CAs will
be liable even when no contractual privity exists between CA and relying party or in
spite of contractual terms that attempt to bind subscriber to terms of CA's certification
practice statement). Such courts might hold the CA liable for some or all damages. Id.
205. See id. (stating that case law, drawn from analogous situations, was not
favorable to CAs' position); see also Kline v. First Western Government Securities, Inc, 24
F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that law firms can not limit its liability to investors if it
stated in opinion letter that letter was for exclusive use of investment firm).
206. See Winn, supra note 14, at 1243 (stating that Guidelines do not concretely
define what is trustworthy system for CA). In addition, it might be possible to define
what makes a trustworthy system for a CA in reference to other guidelines developed in
financial services and military contexts. Id. It is unclear what is an appropriate level of
security for an individual using public key cryptography for personal or household use
on an individual personal computer. Id.
207. See id. at 1244 (stating that Guidelines do not address situation when other
party is business organization rather than natural person). The Guidelines also do not
address issues regarding the ability or inability of the other party to fulfill its contractual
undertaking. Id.
1032 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:1002
legal guidance regarding possible conflicts of law.20 8 The Guide-
lines also assume that the CA will neither put any effort into
learning about the subscriber's circumstances, nor make any
meaningful disclosure to the subscriber regarding the appropri-
ate level of security procedures that the subscriber should use.20 9
b. The Utah Digital Signature Act
With the assistance of the Committee, the U.S. state of Utah
developed its own digital Signature legislation.210 One of the
purposes of this legislation is to promote E-Commerce.2 1 1 The
substantive provisions of the Utah legislation create a liability
structure for digital signature use, make certain legal presump-
tions about digital signatures, 21 2 and impose detailed duties on
all parties to a digital signature transaction.21 3
i. Legislative History of the Utah Digital Signature Act
In 1995, Utah became the first jurisdiction in the world to
enact comprehensive legislation governing the implementation
and use of digital signatures for E-Commerce.214 Utah devel-
oped this legislation in collaboration with the Committee.215
Some members of the Committee drafted a sample digital signa-
ture statute for the Utah legislature even before the Guidelines
were complete.2 16 This collaboration resulted in the enactment
208. See id. (affirming belief that contracting parties in E-Commerce transaction
need to have information and legal guidance regarding possible conflicts of laws). For
example, if the parties do not live in the same jurisdiction, they bear the risk of being
brought into court in a remote and hostile jurisdiction for any dispute arising out of the
transaction. Id.
209. Id. at 1247.
210. Biddle, supra note 91, at 1232-33; see Dorney, supra note 171, at 157 (explain-
ing that some members of Committee assisted Utah legislature in drafting digital signa-
ture statute).
211. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-102(1) (1995) (stating purpose of Utah Act is "to
facilitate commerce by means of reliable electronic messages").
212. See Smith & Keehan, supra note 10, at 510 (explaining that Utah Act appor-
tions, creates, and limits liability of CA, public key-private key holder, and party who
relies on certificate).
213. See Biddle, supra note 91, at 1232 (arguing Utah Act imposes duties on CAs,
digital signature users, and parties that rely on digital signatures).
214. Smith & Keehan, supra note 10, at 509-10.
215. Biddle, supra note 91, at 1232-33.
216. Dorney, supra note 171, at 157.
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of the Utah Digital Signature Act ("Utah Act")217 Following en-
actment, nearly a dozen states proposed digital signature legisla-
tion that closely resembled the Utah Act.2 1 8 The Utah Act has
also been influential at the international level.2 19
The drafters of the Utah Act intended to facilitate E-Com-
merce by promoting the use of digital signatures on computer-
based documents.2 2 ° Commentators state that the Utah Act al-
lows various types of personal and commercial transactions to be
performed online.22 1 The Utah Act also provides a comprehen-
sive digital signature legal framework, which the drafters felt
would be sufficient to allow the widespread adoption and use of
digital signatures in E-Commerce.2 2 2  It created a legal infra-
structure in which users employ repositories, 2 23 CAs, and public-
key encryption technology to sign electronic documents in a le-
gally binding fashion. 224 Additionally,, the Utah Act intended
217. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3 (1995) (setting forth Utah Act, which applies to
use of digital signatures in all applications); Biddle, supra note 91, at 1232-33.
218. See Biddle, supra note 91, at 1233 (stating relationship between Washington
and Minnesota digital signature laws and Utah Act). In 1997, Washington and Minne-
sota enacted laws that closely tracked the Utah Act. Id. California rejected using the
Utah Act as a model, but early drafts of the California law closely followed it. Id.
219. See id. (listing countries that have looked at Utah Act for guidance). Malaysia
enacted legislation based upon the Utah Act. Id. Australia, Canada, Germany, Singa-
pore, the European Union (or "EU"), and the United Nations Committee on Interna-
tional Trade Law have utilized the Utah Act in their pro posed or enacted legislation.
Id. at 1233-34.
220. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-102(1) (1995) (stating one purpose of Utah Act is
to facilitate commerce by means of electronic messages that are reliable).
221. See Smith & Keehan, supra note 10, at 510 (explaining some permissible and
potential transactions through use of Utah Act). These transactions include purchases
of financial products, the filing of tax returns, and submissions of applications for ap-
proval. Id. Utah authorities are working together with private groups to facilitate elec-
tronic transactions by using digital signatures. Id. The state has been involved in the
recently founded Utah Electronic Law Project, a private initiative that attempts to ad-
vance the transition to electronic commerce by the end of the year. Id.
222. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-102 (1995) (stating purposes of Utah Act). Part I
of the Utah Act states that its goal is to effectuate the four following purposes. Id. First,
the Utah Act is to facilitate commerce by means of reliable electronic messages. Id.
Second, the Utah Act is to minimize the incidence of forged digital signatures and
fraud in E-Commerce. Id. Third, the Utah Act implements legally the general import
of relevant standards, such as X.509 of the International Telecommunication Union.
Id. Fourth, the Utah Act establishes, in coordination with multiple states, uniform rules
regarding the authentication and reliability of electronic messages. Id.
223. See id. § 46-3-103(29) (defining repository as "system for storing and retriev-
ing certificates and other information relevant to digital signatures").
224. See id. § 46-1-103(10) (defining digital signature as "transformation of a
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digital signatures to use hash functions. 2 5
ii. Substantive Provisions of the Utah Act
Under the Utah Act, a digital signature is as valid as if it
were written on paper.226 A document with a digital signature
creates a rebuttable legal presumption that the message sender
intended to be legally bound by its contents. 227 In addition, a
digital signature that satisfies the criteria of the Utah Act will
satisfy any Utah rule of law requiring a written signature. 228 This
provision eliminated the need to expressly amend each Utah
statute that has a writing or signature requirement. 229 Further-
more, the Utah Act gives documents that are signed with digital
signatures legal status similar to that of notarized documents. °
In addition to giving legal status to digital signatures, the
Utah Act maintains that the state will act as the main CA and will
be in charge of licensing CAs. 23' The Utah Department of Com-
message using an asymmetric cryptosystem"); see also id. §§ 46-3-301-310 (listing duties
of CA and subscriber).
225. Biddle, supra note 95, at 1143.
226. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-403 (stating that digital signature is "as valid, en-
forceable, and effective as if it had been written on paper, if it" meets two require-
ments). The message must "bear in its entirety a digital signature." Id. Finally, the
digital signature must have been "verified by the public key listed in a certificate" that
was validly issued by a licensed CA at the time the digital signature was created. Id.;
Dorney, supra note 171, at 157.
227. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-406(3) (b) (1995) (presuming that signer of digi-
tal signature affixed the digital signature with intention of signing message); see also
Dorney, supra note 171, at 157-58 (stating that in order for this provision to be applica-
ble, digital signature is verified by reference to public key listed in valid certificate is-
sued by licensed CA).
228. See UTAH CoDE ANN. § 46-3-401 (1995) (allowing digital signatures to satisfy
rule of law that requires signatures or provides consequences in absence of signature).
Digital signatures can satisfy a law requiring a written signature if it satisfies three re-
quirements. Id. The digital signature must be verified by reference to the public key
listed in a valid certificate issued by a licensed CA. Id. The signer must affix the digital
signature with the intention of signing the message. Id. Finally, the recipient must not
know that the signer breached a subscriber duty or does not rightfully hold the private
key used to affix the digital signature. Id.
229. Dorney, supra note 171, at 158.
230. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-405 (1995) (stating that "certificate issued by a
licensed CA is an acknowledgment of a digital signature verified by reference to the
public key listed in the certificate"). This status is given "regardless of whether words of
an express acknowledgment appear with the digital signature or whether the signer
physically appeared before the CA when the digital signature was created, if that digital
signature is verifiable by that certificate and affixed when that certificate was valid". Id.
231. See Utah Act § 46-3-201(2) (requiring Division to issue licenses for CAs).
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merce will directly regulate CAs.232 The Utah legislature used
this scheme in order to give users confidence to utilize digital
signatures as a viable authentication procedure for E-Commerce
233transactions.
The Utah Act also outlines the responsibilities of a CA.23 4 It
limits who can qualify as a licensed CA. 235 A licensed CA must
post a bond or letter of credit.236 The Utah Act also sets forth
adequate record keeping procedures and provides for the regu-
lar audit of CAs.23 7 Moreover, the Utah Act sets out the proce-
dure that CAs must follow when they cease to act as a CA or
when they issue, revoke, or suspend a certificate. 238 The Utah
Act specifies certain information that must be included in the
certificate. 239 Licensing under the Utah Act is voluntary, yet li-
censed CAs are offered limited liability as a legal benefit for be-
coming licensed under the act.240
One expert has argued that the liability scheme is one of
the most analyzed parts of the Utah Act.24a The Utah Act im-
232. See id. § 46-3-103(11) (defining Division as Division of Corporations and Com-
mercial Code within Utah Department of Commerce).
233. See Winn, supra note 14, at 1202 (explaining situation on how parties can rely
on CA). Winn argues that one method of reliance is to setup another type of CA, called
a root CA, who would certify other CAs. Id. The problem is creating a root CA that will
give confidence to parties to use digital signatures as a viable authentication procedure
in E-Commerce applications. Id. The Utah legislature enacted legislation that author-
ized the state to act as the root CA and to provide for the licensing of CAs. Id.
234. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-301 (1995) (delineating duties of CA). A CA can
issue, suspend, or revoke a certificate. Id. A CA must give notice on the issuance, sus-
pension, or revocation of a certificate. Id. A CA can create a private key. Id.
235. See id. § 46-3-201 (listing licensing requirements for CAs). The CA must not
employ anyone convicted of fraud. Id. § 46-3-201(1)(b). The CA must maintain an
office in Utah or have a registered agent for service of process. Id. § 4 6 -3-201 (1) (g). A
party involved in the Utah Act must be the subscriber of a certificate that is published in
a recognized repository, which is defined in Utah Act § 46-3-501. Id. at § 46-3-
201(1) (a).
236. See id. § 46-3-201 (1) (d) (requiring CAs to file suitable guaranty with Division);
see also id. § 46-3-103(34) (defining what satisfies surety guaranty).
237. See id. § 46-3-202 (setting forth procedure on how CA will be audited).
238. See id. § 46-3-302 (setting forth procedure on how CA will issue, revoke, or
suspend certificate).
239. See id. § 46-3-103(3) (stating that certificate is computer based record that
identifies CA who issued it, names the subscriber, contains subscriber's public key, and
is signed digitally by CA who issued it). Id.
240. Biddle, supra note 91, at 1233.
241. See Biddle, supra note 95, at 1193 (stating that Utah Act's liability provision
allocates risks to parties using digital signatures and is extensively studied by CAs and
consumers).
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poses a standard of care on CAs that is comparable to the negli-
gence standard imposed on notaries, but with some notable devi-
ations.2 4 2 When a CA complies with the duties articulated in the
Utah Act, the CA enters the safe harbor provision under the
Utah Act that shelters them from liability. 243 The Utah Act di-
rectly limits the liability of licensed CAs in two ways; one method
is that if the CA complied with the Utah Act then it is not liable
for losses by a false or forged digital signature.2 4 Under the sec-
ond method, the Utah Act limits the liability for licensed CAs for
their errors or negligence to the amount specified in the certifi-
cate.24 5
Some experts argue that the Utah Act also indirectly pro-
tects CAs through its liability scheme regarding digital signature
users.2 4 6 Consumers who participate in the public key infrastruc-
ture under the Utah Act subject themselves to a great risk of
liability.247 Under the Utah Act, the user whose private key was
used to sign a document has unlimited liability if he failed to use
reasonable care to protect his private key.248 The Utah Act cre-
ates certain rebuttable presumptions in disputes involving the
242. See id. at 1180 (explaining difference with notary model). Once a forgery has
been shown, the notary model shifts the burden of persuasion in a dispute over a
forged acknowledgement or signature. Id. Once a plaintiff shows that a signature is
forged, the burden shifts to the notary who must prove that it exercised the proper
standard of care. Id. The Utah Act has no similar provision. Id.
243. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-309(2) (a) (1995) (stating that licensed CA is not
liable for any reliance loss caused by false signature of subscriber if CA complied with
all material requirements). The CA is also not liable over "the amount specified in the
certificate as its recommended reliance limit for either a loss caused by reliance on a
misrepresentation in the certificate of any fact that the licensed CA is required to con-
firm or failure to comply with § 46-3-302 in issuing the certificate." Id.; see Biddle, supra
note 95, at 1180 (explaining liability structure in Utah Act). The Utah Act states that
certification authorities shall not be liable for any loss that is caused by reliance on a
false or forged digital signature of a subscriber if the CA complied with all the material
requirements. Biddle, supra.
244. See id. § 46-3-309(2) (a) (stating that CAs may not be liable for false or forged
digital signatures). A CA is not liable for any loss that is caused by reliance on a false or
forged digital signature if the CA complied with all the requirements. Id. A CA can
waive this protection. Id.
245. See id. § 46-3-309(1) (specifying CA's limit to damages because CA is not liable
for any reliance losses, punitive or exemplary damages, and pain and suffering dam-
ages).
246. Biddle, supra note 91, at 1236.
247. Biddle, supra note 95, at 1144.
248. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-305(1) (1995) (stating that subscriber identified
in certificate assumes duty to exercise reasonable care to retain control of private key).
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user and the CA.249 The user must present to a court clear and
convincing evidence to overcome these presumptions. 250 For ex-
ample, suppose a licensed CA issues a certificate to a sub-
scriber.251 Suppose a subscriber has his private key stolen by a
third party25 2 and the third party uses the private key to cash a
$30,000 electronic check drawn from the user's account prior to
the private key's revocation.253 In court, the user must overcome
the presumption that the electronic check signed with his digital
signature is valid and binding upon him.254 If the user fails to
overcome this presumption, then he must bear the $30,000
loss. 2 5 5
2. International Initiatives
Many nations have enacted or are in the process of enacting
digital signature laws. 2 56  Germany became the first European
nation to enact a comprehensive digital signature law. 2 57 In ad-
dition, the European Commission ("Commission" or "EC") has
proposed a directive on digital signatures similar to the German
legislation. 2
58
249. See Biddle, supra note 95, at 1168 (stating presumptions set forth by Utah
Act). The Utah Act instructs courts to presume that if a digital signature is verified by
the public key listed in a certificate validly issued by a licensed CA, then there are three
consequences. Id. The subscriber has accepted the corresponding certificate and
therefore has assumed the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect his private key.
Id. The digital signature belongs to the subscriber listed in the certificate. Id. Finally,
the digital signature was affixed with the intention of' signing the message. Id.
250. See Biddle, supra note 91, at 1236 (describing the clear and convincing stan-
dard as being higher than usual mere preponderance of evidence standard in civil
cases); see also Biddle, supra note 95, at 1168-69 (explaining how digital signatures have
higher standard of proof). Under the Utah Act, digitally signed documents are consid-
ered acknowledged documents. Biddle, supra note 86. The burden of proof for an
acknowledged document is that a party needs clear and convincing evidence. Id. This
standard is more onerous than the mere preponderance of the evidence. Id.
251. Biddle, supra note 95, at 1169.
252. Biddle, supra note 91, at 1236.
253. Biddle, supra note 95, at 1169.
254. Id. at 1170.
255. Id.
256. See McBride Baker & Coles, Summary of Electronic Commerce and Digital Signature
Legislation (visited Jan. 17, 1999) <http://www.mbc.com/ds-sum.html> (on file with
the Fordham International Law Journal) (summarizing U.S. state, U.S. federal, and inter-
national initiatives on digital signatures).
257. Kiefer, supra note 21, at 11.
258. See id. (stating that United States encouraged development of voluntary, mar-
ket-driven key management infrastructure that could perform integral functions of au-
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a. The German Act
On July 22, 1997, Germany enacted the Gesetz zur digitalen
Signatur, or the Act on Digital Signature ("German Act") .259 Ar-
ticle 3 of the Federal Information and Communication Services
Act embodies the German Act.260 The German Act sets out a
framework for the safe use of digital signatures in business trans-
actions over the Internet. 26 1
i. Legislative History of the German Act
One commentator states that the enactment of the German
Act indicated that Germany's political leaders intended to facili-
tate legal certainty in the area of digital signatures.262 German
lawyers practice and train in the Civil Code system and therefore
must derive legal guidance from codified law.263 German policy-
makers quickly draft new legislation when they discover an un-
regulated area. 264 The German Civil Code already provides that
most agreements do not require a written form.265 The drafters
of the German Act established these regulations in order to
make Internet transactions using digital signatures more se-
cure.
2 6 6
ii. Substantive Provisions of the German Act
The German Act defines digital signatures and sets forth the
thentication, integrity, and confidentiality). The German law and the new EU Directive
incorporate these ideas. Id.
259. Gesetz zur digitalen Signatur (Signaturgesetz), v. <22.7.1997> (BGB1. I S.
1870, 1872); Kiefer, supra note 21, at 11
260. Informations und Kommunikationsdiente Gesetz (Kommunikation-
sdientegesetz), 37 I.L.M. 564 (1998); Heiner Buenting, The New German Multimedia
Law-A Model For the United States, 14 No. 9 COMPUTER LAW. 17, 17 (1997).
261. Kiefer, supra note 21, at 11.
262. Buenting, supra note 260, at 21.
263. Id. at 17; see Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook: Germany, (visited Jan. 4,
1999) <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/gm.html> (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal) (giving overview on Germany and stating that Ger-
many has civil law system with judicial review of legislative acts in Federal Constitutional
Court).
264. Buenting, supra note 260, at 17.
265. Id. at 18.
266. See Gesetz zur digitalen Signatur (Signaturgesetz), v. <22.7.1997> (BGBI. I S.
1870, 1872) § 1(1) (stating that "[tihe purpose of this law is to create conditions for
digital signatures under which they may be deemed secure and forgeries of digital sig-
natures or falsifications of signed data may be reliably ascertained").
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roles of the involved parties.267 In addition, it contemplates the
use of public key cryptography.2 a8 As defined in the German
Act, a digital signature seals and labels digitized data that is in-
tended for electronic transmission.2 69 A certifier, 270 or CA, gives
the user a private digital signature.27 1 A user's participation
under the German Act is voluntary because the Act does not re-
quire users to use a digital signature from a licensed CA. 72
Participation under the German Act by CAs is also volun-
tary.273 The German Act allows the central government to set up
a licensing scheme for CAs .2 " The government gives this power
to the German Telekom authority,275 which can grant a license
to any applicant who is reliable and has the necessary expert
knowledge.276 The CA must also implement a detailed and ap-
proved security plan setting forth all security measures, the tech-
nology utilized, and an organizational flowchart.7
267. See id. § 2(1) (defining digital signature); see also id. § 3 (defining state in-
volvement); id. § 4 (describing licensing process for GAs).
268. See id. § 2(1) (stating that digital signature is seal that "digital data created
with a private signature key, which seal allows, by use of the associated public key to
which a signature key certificate of a [CA] or of the Authority under § 3 is affixed, the
owner of signature key and unforged character of data to be ascertained").
269. Buenting, supra note 260, at 18.
270. See Signaturgesetz, § 2(2) (defining certifier as "natural or legal person which
attests to the attribution of public signature keys to natural persons and holds a license
therefore under Seciton 4").
271. See id. § 5(1) (stating that CA "shall reliably identify persons who apply for a
certificate"); see also Buenting, supra note 260, at 18 (obtaining license requires that
applicant be identified). The use of a pseudonym with the digital signature is allowed.
Buenting, supra, at 18.
272. See Buenting, supra note 260, at 18-19 (stating that German government
hopes that technical standards set in German Act will become generally accepted).
273. See Christopher Kuner, Commentary to the German Digital Signature Law (visited
Jan. 17, 1999) <http://www.kuner.com/data/sig/digsig4.htm> (on file with the Ford-
ham International Law Journal) (stating that while German Act is voluntary, German gov-
ernment wants to create defacto standard for use of digital signatures); see also Kiefer,
supra note 21, at 11 (stating that compliance with German Act is purely voluntary).
Businesses may choose to proceed within the German Act when using digital signatures
and certificates. Kiefer, supra, at 11.
274. See Gesetz zur digitalen Signatur (Signaturgesetz), v. <22.7.1997> (BGB1. I S.
1870, 1872) § 3 (stating that granting of licenses under German Act rests with German
government).
275. See id. § 4(1) (requiring certifiers to be licensed by Telekom Authority).
276. See id. § 4(2) (requiring that license given to certifier shall be denied if factual
ground exists that applicant does not have reliability necessary to be certifier or does
not have expert knowledge for operation to be certifier); see also id. § 4(3) (defining
requirements of reliability and expert knowledge).
277. See Kiefer, supra note 21, at 11 (stating that German Telekom Authority rigor-
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Under the German Act, the CA's main responsibility is to
issue digital certificates. 27" The CA's technology must conform
to certain performance standards. 279 For example, the technol-
ogy must guarantee that subscribers have a functioning key pair
and a tool that keeps the private key secret.280
In certain situations, the German Act gives digital signatures
legal effect. 28 ' An example of the enforcement of digital signa-
tures is when parties agree to their use in a contract.28 2 Other
types of contracts still require a written signature.283
The German Act also addresses the issue of reciprocity with
digital signatures from other countries. 28 4 The German Act pro-
vides for mutual recognition of digital signature certificates from
other European Union ("EU") Member States, as long as those
States are judged to have an equivalent security level. 2 5 A non-
EU country must be party to an agreement with Germany in or-
der to receive reciprocity for the other country's digital signa-
tures.2 8 6 Germany has not yet signed a treaty with the United
ously analyzes these three requirements). The CA must report to the Telekom Author-
ity every two years on continuing compliance with the German Act and its regulations.
Id.
278. See id. (explaining that to obtain certificate, private persons must enter pri-
vate services contract with CAs).
279. See id. (stating that standards are based on International Information Tech-
nology Security Evaluation Criteria and Information Technology Security Evaluation
Manual).
280. See id. (requiring that key pair be unique). It must be impossible to either
duplicate the private key or to derive the private key from knowing the public key. Id.
The technology being used must keep the private key secret. Id.
281. Id.
282. See id. (stating that when parties agree to use digital signatures, these con-
tracts are enforceable under German Act).
283. See id. (explaining that under German law, transactions in real property trans-
actions, wills, long-term leases and certain loan securities require written signatures).
284. See Gesetz zur digitalen Signatur (Signaturgesetz), v. <22.7.1997> (BGB1. I S.
1870, 1872) § 15(1) (stating that non-German certificates "with a public key signature
for which a foreign certificate of another Member State of the European Union or of
another Contracting State of the Treaty on the European Economic Area exists are
equivalent to digital signatures under this law, insofar as they demonstrate an
equivalent level of security"); id § 15(2) (stating that certificates from "other States,
insofar as supranational or international agreements concerning the recognition of cer-
tificates have been concluded").
285. See id. § 15(1) (allowing digital signature certificates from EU Member States
if they are equivalent to digital signatures under German Act and have equivalent level
of security).
286. See id. § 15(2) (applying same response for non-EU nation if it has treaty with
Germany for digital signatures).
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States regarding the acknowledgement. of U.S. digital signa-
tures.2 8
7
The German Act does not address other areas of concern,
such as the liability of using digital signatures.288 The German
Act also does not specify whether digital signatures can be used
as evidence in a court proceeding.289 By itself, a digital signature
will not meet the standards of documentary evidence but may
have some probative value if introduced as evidence in court.29 0
b. EC Draft Directive on Digital Signatures
One expert has opined that the Commission legislation is
similar to the German Act. 291 The Commission, however, pro-
posed a digital signature guideline that would create minimum
rules concerning security and liability and ensure that digital sig-
natures are recognized legally throughout Europe based on the
principles of the Single Market. 29 2 The proposed legislation cov-
ers a range of legal topics under digital signatures.293
i. Legislative History of the Commission Draft Directive
On October 8, 1997, the Commission adopted a communi-
cation that recommended creating a European Framework for
digital signatures ("Communication") .2 4 The purpose of the
287. Buenting, supra note 260, at 19.
288. See Kiefer, supra note 21, at 11 (stating that traditional concepts of German
contract and tort law govern liability issues).
289. Buenting, supra note 260, at 18.
290. See id. (explaining that digital signatures lack required physical form for
under Section 415 of the German Civil Procedure Code). This obstacle could be over-
come because the German Civil Procedure Code allows production of evidence if there
is judicial inspection. Id.
291. See Kiefer, supra note 21, at 11 (stating that both German Act and European
framework are voluntary and both provide for mutual recognition for digital signatures
within European Union). Kiefer argues that the German Act can be expected to be a
model for European Union. Id.
292. See Heather Rowe, European Commission's Proposal for an 'Electronic Signatures'
Directive, 3 CYBERSPACE LAW. 10 (1998) (describing principle of Single Market as free
movement of services and home country control within Europe).
293. See id. (stating that Commission legislation is in technology neutral language
and that this legislation defines basic requirements for digital signatures, creates liabil-
ity framework, gives legal effect to digital signatures, describes certification measures,
and includes mechanisms for cooperation with non-EU countries).
294. European Commission, Ensuring Security and Trust in Electronic Communi-
cation: Toward a European Framework for Digital Signatures and Encryption, COM
(97) 503 (Oct. 1997) [herinafter Communication].
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Communication was to establish and to develop a European
legal framework for digital signatures. 295 The drafters of the
Communication also wanted to provide parties with the security
and trust necessary for the use of digital signatures. 296 Experts
have stated that the lack of security on electronic networks, such
as the Internet, is one of the major obstacles impeding the devel-
opment of E-Commerce. 297  The Communication covered nu-
merous areas with respect to digital signatures. 298  On May 13,
1998, the Commission followed the Communication with a draft
proposal on a Common Framework for Electronic Signatures
("Draft Directive") .2" The Draft Directive establishes a de
minimis set of rules concerning liability and security and ensures
that digital signatures are legally recognized throughout the Eu-
ropean Community. 00 The Draft Directive is considered timely
because certain European Community Member States have en-
acted or are in the process of enacting digital signature legisla-
tion.30
295. See Communication, supra note 294, COM (97) 503, at 2 (defining goals of
Ensuring Security and Trust in Electronic Communication ("Communication")). The
Communication stated that a European framework for digital signatures should be es-
tablished, which would ensure the functioning of the Internal Market for cryptographic
products and services and stimulate a European industry for these products. Id. An-
other goal of the Communication is to remove barriers for cryptographic services and
products, thus enabling all economic sectors to benefit from the opportunities of a
global information society based on a framework of trust. Id.
296. See id. at 1 (explaining that first part of Communication emphasized authenti-
cation and integrity services because they are essential for secure and trustworthy data
transmission and communication over all open networks). "In order to make good use
of the commercial opportunities offered by electronic communication via open net-
works, a secure and trustworthy environment is therefore necessary." Id. "Digital signa-
tures can help to prove the origin of data (authentication) and verify whether data has
been altered (integrity)." Id.
297. Rowe, supra note 292; see Kiefer, supra note 21, at 10 (explaining that any EU
legislation is part of overall initiative by policymakers to promote security for E-Com-
merce transactions, especially for transactions involving financial services).
298. See Communication, supra note 294, COM (97) 503, at 2-5 (discussing and
defining digital signatures, certification process, key management, mutual recognition
in different countries, privacy, legal problems, liability, legal recognition of digital sig-
natures, and regulatory considerations).
299. European Commission, Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Di-
rective on a Common Framework for Electronic Signatures, COM (98) 297 Final (May
1998) [hereinafter Draft Directive]; see Rowe, supra note 292 (citing one of its main
supporters, Mr Martin Bangemann, who stressed that ability to conduct secure E-Com-
merce is essential to stimulate use of E-Commerce).
300. See Rowe, supra note 292 (explaining that principles of mutual recognition of
digital signatures throughout European Union follow Single Market principles).
301. See id. (referring to Mr. Mario Monti of the European Commission, who has
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ii. Substantive Provisions of the Draft Directive
The Draft Directive begins by setting forth the requirements
of a digital signature.3 °2 The directive also sets forth the require-
ments for digital signature certificates.3 °3 Under the Draft Direc-
tive, all digital signatures are given full legal effect, even when
they are not based on a qualified certificate or issued by an ac-
credited CA.10 4 A digital signature that meets the Draft Directive
requirements satisfies laws that require a written signature and is
admissible as evidence in legal proceedings. 0 5 Furthermore,
the Draft Directive also defines other components and parties
involved in the use of digital signatures. 6
The Draft Directive refers to CAs as certification service
providers ("CSPs"). °7 CSPs must follow certain requirements. 308
CSPs that comply with the Draft Directive have a set liability pro-
vision. 0 9
agreed that proposal is timely because most Member States have not set up legislative
framework for digital signatures). Mr. Monti stated that this proposal can ensure a
harmonious legal framework for the Single Market from the outset instead of having to
counter potentially disparate national initiatives. Id.
302. See Draft Directive, supra note 299, COM (98) 297 Final, art. 2(1) (defining
electronic signature as signature in digital form that is either attached to or logically
associated with data that is used by a signatory to indicate their acceptance of the con-
tent of that data).
303. See Rowe, supra note 292 (defining these requirements). The Commission of
the European Communities wanted to ensure a minimum level of security and free
movement throughout the Single Market. Id. These requirements are not technical in
nature. Id. Policy makers wanted the Draft Directive to be technology neutral. Id.
304. See Draft Directive, supra note 299, COM (98) 297 Final, art. 5(1) (requiring
Member States not to deny legal effect, validity, and enforceability solely because signa-
ture is in electronic form, not based upon qualified certificate, or not based upon certif-
icate issued by accredited certification service provider).
305. See id. art. 5(2) (stating that digital signatures are admissible only in same
manner as handwritten signatures).
306. See id. art. 2(2)-(7) (defining signature creation device, signature verification
device, qualified certificate, certification service provider, electronic signature prod-
uct).
307. See id. art. 2(6) (defining certification service providers as entity or person
that issues certificates or performs other services related to digital signatures to public).
308. See id. annex II (listing requirements for CAs such as demonstrating reliability
necessary for offering certification services, operate prompt and secure revocation ser-
vice, and verify through appropriate means identity and capacity of person that a certifi-
cate will be issued).
309. See Draft Directive, supra note 299, COM (98) 297 Final, art. 6 (explaining
that CA would be liable only to person who reasonably relies upon certificate in four
instances). Under the Draft Directive, the CA would be liable for the accuracy of all
information in the qualified certificate as of the issuance date, unless stated otherwise
by the CA. Id. A CA would have to comply with all the requirements of the European
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Digital signatures that comply with the Draft Directive can
circulate freely throughout the Internal Market.3 10 Articles 3
and 4 of the Draft Directive deal with the treatment of digital
signature legislation by Member States.3" The Draft Directive
prohibits restrictions on certification services that originate from
other Member States. 1 2 The Draft Directive also contains a
mechanism for recognizing digital signature certificates from
other countries.31 3
II. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST A GLOBAL
REGULATORY SCHEME FOR DIGITAL SIGNATURES:
WHAT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST
OF E-COMMERCE?
Many jurisdictions have enacted digital signature legislation
that either recognizes or regulates digital signature use. 1 4 Some
commentators suggest that legislators create digital signature
laws and business people support them because both groups
want to protect and to nurture E-Commerce.315 As a result of
Directive in the certificate. Id. A CA must ensure that the party identified in the quali-
fied certificate held the signature creation device that corresponds to the signature
verification device given or identified in the certificate. Id. A CA must also assure that
the signature verification device and the signature creation device both work in a com-
plementary manner. Id.
310. See id. art 4(2) (allowing digital signature products that comply with Directive
to circulate freely through internal market).
311. See id. art. 3 (discussing market access stating that "Member States shall not
make the provision of certification services subject to prior authorization"); see also id.
art. 4 (discussing Internal Market Principles); id. art. 3(2) (stating that "Member States
may introduce or maintain voluntary accreditation systems aiming at enhanced levels of
certification service provision"). These schemes must be objective, proportionate, non-
discriminatory, and transparent. Id. § 3(2).
312. See id. art. 4(1) (restricting Member States from prohibiting certification serv-
ices from other Member States).
313. See id. art. 7(1) (specifying how to deal with non EU certificates). A certifi-
cate issued by a non-EU certification service provider will be legally equivalent to certifi-
cates by an EU member in three ways. Id. The CA can fulfill the requirements of the
European Directive and become accredited by a Member State. Id. A CA, established
in the Community and who fulfills the requirements of the European Directive, guaran-
tees the non-EU CA to the same extent as its own certificates. Id. Finally, the certificate
or CA is recognized under a bilateral or multilateral agreement between the Commu-
nity and third countries or international organizations. Id.
314. See Barassi, supra note 26 (stating that U.S. states, Argentina, Chile, Denmark,
Germany, Italy, Malaysia, and EU have already drafted digital signature legislation).
315. See Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 3, at 307-08 (stating that growth of E-
Commerce affects every sector of economy). This growth has attracted the attention of
policy makers and they realize that E-Commerce can achieve its full potential if a mod-
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these different laws, proponents of a global regulatory scheme
for digital signatures argue that such a scheme will promote E-
Commerce by providing certainty and guidance and by eliminat-
ing currently conflicting lws.3 16 Opponents of a global regula-
tory scheme for digital signatures argue that such a scheme will
inhibit E-Commerce transactions with a burdensome regulatory
structure.317
A. Arguments for a Global Regulatory Scheme for Digital Signatures
Will Promote E-CommeTrce
Proponents of a global scheme for regulating digital signa-
tures argue that such a scheme promotes E-Commerce 18 They
argue that not only will a global scheme promote E-Commerce
by providing certainty about the legal effect of transactions using
digital signatures, but also that such a scheme may provide gui-
dance to parties in the use of digital signatures.3 19 They also ar-
gue that conflicting digital signature laws must be eliminated in
order to allow flow of goods and services from E-Commerce
transactions.3 2 °
The Internet supports many types of transactions and these
transactions can take place between well-established clients or
strangers. 2 1 Some experts state that the digital signature is the
ern legal infrastructure supports the use of online services for business and government
transactions. Id.
316. See Parker, supra note 24 (arguing that because digital signature legislation is
being created on so many different levels, parties engaging in E-Commerce have to deal
with many important issues, one of which is conflicting standards).
317. See Winn, supra note 14, at 1253 (arguing that interest groups are pressuring
their legislatures to devise regulatory scheme before full maturation of E-Commerce).
318. See Sabett, supra note 16, at 525-26 (arguing that for E-Commerce revolution
to occur, legal framework is need to delineate liabilities, responsibilities, and rights of
parties involved). Sabett further argues that international E-Commerce cannot occur
on a vast scale unless a law provides clarity with respect to E-Commerce. Id.
319. SeeJohn F. Olson et al., Letter from the Editors: State Legislation Lags Market and
Technology, 2 No.2 WALLSTREETLAWVER.COM: SEC.ELEc.AGE 2 (1998) (describing prob-
lem with U.S. state digital signature legislations). States have either not adopted legisla-
tion that recognizes digital signatures or have enacted non-uniform laws. Id.
320. See Kiefer, supra note 21, at 9 (noting that many nations have enacted con-
flicting standards and that some of these standards have been criticized as being overly
burdensome to E-Commerce).
321. See Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 3, at 314-15 (showing that tax returns,
mortgage applications, and other complicated agreements can be carried out through
Internet); Winn, supra note 14, at 1207 (explaining difference in, treatment of known
and unknown parties in conducting E-Commerce transactions). Parties who have pre-
existing business relationships can agree upon authentication procedures. Winn, supra.
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necessary catalyst to expand E-Commerce. 22 They argue that
digital signatures can guarantee a high level of validity, authen-
ticity, and security necessary to conduct faceless electronic trans-
actions . 23 They further argue that in order to fully utilize digital
signatures, nations must enact appropriate legal framework.324
Some experts conclude that international E-Commerce transac-
tions cannot occur on a large scale unless a global regime is set
in place that provides adequate clarity and guidance for con-
321ducting transactions.
1. Global Regulatory Scheme for Digital Signatures Will
Promote Legal Certainty in International
E-Commerce Transactions
Proponents argue that the absence of a global legal infra-
structure for digital signatures is an enormous barrier to wide-
spread E-Commerce. 26 Presently, no international rules gov-
erning digital signatures exist.327 Although numerous states, na-
tions, and regional organizations have enacted digital signature
legislation, many policy makers recognize the need for interna-
tional cooperation in creating a global regulatory scheme for
digital signatures. 3 28
Parties face great uncertainty when they conduct transac-
Parties wishing to solicit new business have greater security concerns. Id. These secur-
ity and authentication problems can be resolved using digital signatures. Id.
322. Smith & Keehan, supra note 10, at 507.
323. Id.
324. See Ballen & Fox, supra note 20, at 339 (arguing that this framework can be
either in governing body of law that provides for the enforceability of electronic docu-
ments signed with digital signatures, and/or in private agreements). Ballen & Fox fur-
ther argue that if a governing body of law is enacted, a digital signature must be recog-
nized as a writing. Id.
325. See Sabett, supra note 16, at 526 (arguing that legal framework can help par-
ties in E-Commerce transactions). Legal commentators argue that in order for the
revolution to occur, a legal framework must be erected that will delineate the rights,
responsibilities, and liabilities of the various parties involved. Id. at 525-26; see Dorney,
supra note 171, at 160 (arguing that in order to foster E-Commerce growth, govern-
ments and private sector should work together to adopt comprehensive legal frame-
work for digital signature use).
326. See Field, supra note 11, at 724 (discussing confusion and hesitation among
parties who wish to engage in E-Commerce transactions, but fear that they will be sub-
ject to unknown risks or that their transaction will be illegal).
327. See Winn, supra note 14, at 1179 (explaining that commercialization of In-
ternet has opened debate on how E-Commerce transaction should be regulated and
has also caused many jurisdictions to pass their own digital signature laws).
328. Kiefer, supra note 21, at 9; see id. at 13 (arguing that despite agreeing on
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tions using digital signatures.12 9 With the lack of international
regulatory guidance, many issues are left unresolved.33 ' One
such question experts have asked is, in terms of cross-border
transactions, what is the legal status to be accorded to certificates
from CAs from other nations with different regulatory
schemes. 31 Legal scholars opine that the various digital authen-
tication legislative efforts have added more uncertainty for an
international business.332 These varied legislative efforts not
only indicate a legal landscape comprised of varied treatment of
digital authentication issues, but also creates uncertainty for the
future of E-Commerce. 3  Some legal scholars argue that these
issues must be addressed to allow digital signatures to assist in
the expansion of E-Commerce.334
necessity of international uniform standards, countries are still developing their own
standards and are thus more interested in shaping than adapting to global standards).
329. See Dorney, supra note 171, at 150 (describing situation of applying written
signatures laws, when digital signatures are used, as creating great uncertainty). A digi-
tal signature is a technical concept. Id. Its legal significance will depend on whether it
is a signature under the applicable law. Id. Under current law in most jurisdictions, the
legal effect of a digital signature would be determined by looking at the circumstances
surrounding a transaction, such as whether the party applying the digital signature in-
tended to be legally bound. Id. It is possible that a digital signature would be found to
be a signature under either current common law or statute. Id. The result is uncertain.
Id.
330. See id. at 150-51 (listing unresolved issues such as who, if anyone, should li-
cense or regulate CAs; what should be scope of such regulation; what are responsibili-
ties of CAs; and what are consequences when a party loses control over its private key).
331. Id.; see Parker, supra note 24 (arguing that because digital signature legisla-
tion is being formulated on different jurisdictional levels, those engaging in E-Com-
merce are at risk of violating these enactments because of varying and potentially con-
flicting standards, especially in international transactions); see also Kiefer, supra note 21,
at 8 (describing current legal situation in United States because United States currently
has no federal legal scheme regarding digital signatures and over 40 state legislatures
have considered or are considering this issue).
332. See Barassi, supra note 26, at 16 (listing nations that have drafted proposed
statutes or regulations that deal with specific issues in regards to digital signature tech-
nology). Barassi argues that current digital signature legislation efforts throughout the
world will disappoint an international business that seeks a predictable legal environ-
ment within to conduct E-Commerce. Id. Also, regional organizations, such as the Eu-
ropean Community and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, are in the process of
enacting standards. Id.
333. Id.
334. See Sabett, supra note 16, at 525-26 (stating that in order for E-Commerce
revolution to occur, legal framework must be erected that delineates liabilities, respon-
sibilities, and rights of various parties involved). Proponents argue that international
electronic transactions cannot occur on a more frequent and vaster scale unless the law
provides adequate clarity. Id.; seeJueneman & Robertion, supra note 6, at 433-34 (stat-
ing that electronically concluding contracts raise legal question on how to establish
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2. Global Regulatory Scheme for Digital Signatures Will Assist
in Developing Uniform Digital Signature Standards
Proponents of a global regulatory scheme for digital signa-
tures argue that the development of this scheme will promote E-
Commerce by assisting countries to develop their own digital sig-
nature standards.335 This scheme could resolve technical issues
by simply establishing a globally-accepted standard.336 Propo-
nents argue that, taken as a whole, a global regulatory scheme
for digital signatures can promote E-Commerce because it would
recognize and support the entire digital signature infrastruc-
ture.33 7
Some experts have stated that a well-formulated statutory
scheme can provide guidance to business persons, programmers,
courts, and regulators, and therefore ultimately facilitate transac-
tions on the Internet and promote E-Commerce. 3 8 For exam-
ple, the law could encourage the growth of this system because it
would recognize the interaction between users and CAs. 3 3 9 This
recognized standard would also promote secure transactions,
which will increase E-Commerce. 4 ° Some commentators note
genuineness of E-Commerce transactions because these transactions consist solely of
streams of ones and zeroes). Legislators have attempted to reform existing legal re-
quirements for written documents in order to give legal recognition to electronically
signed documents. Jueneman & Robertson, supra.
335. See Smith & Keehan, supra note 10, at 507 (arguing that global law is critical
for conduct and consummation of financial and other E-Commerce transactions).
336. Id.; see Sabett, supra note 16, at 533 (explaining that harmonized law or set of
guidelines can apply to all areas of digital signatures). Some experts state that for the
technology to reach its fullest potential, progress must be made at all levels of the law.
Sabett, supra, at 533. The clarification of details of digital signature use will widely
implement E-Commerce and make it be used effectively. Id.
337. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-102(1)-(3) (1995) (stating that Utah Act is in-
tended to facilitate commerce by means of reliable electronic messages and to imple-
ment uniform standards).
338. See Smith & Keehan, supra note 10, at 507 (giving example of commercial and
retail customers who would be able to purchase financial institution's products and
services and to execute binding legal obligations over Internet).
339. SeeJueneman & Robertson, supra note 6, at 443-44 (stating that legally recog-
nizing users that have private and public keys and that use CAs would promote secure
E-Commerce transactions). Users could enter into binding contracts by using a private
and public key. Id. A CA could provide the parties with verification that they are deal-
ing with the proper parties. Id. More users would enter into binding contracts with this
system in place. Id.
340. See Eldridge, supra note 55, at 1813 (stating that more consumers can go to
merchants' Internet sites and purchase items by using their credit card because con-
sumers will be assured that transaction is secure).
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that the surge in Internet activity indicates that the development
of legal standards and protections that enforce electronic trans-
actions and electronic signatures are still in the embryonic
stage.341 One recent report on Internet activity shows that E-
Commerce will quickly and prematurely level off if comprehen-
sive laws are not enacted to define the parameters for enforcea-
ble and valid electronic transactions and agreements. 42
3. A Global Regulatory Scheme for Digital Signature Will
Promote E-Commerce by Eliminating the Current
Conflict of Digital Signature Laws
Proponents of a global regulatory scheme for digital signa-
ture argue that consistent laws are needed in order to promote
E-Commerce. 343 Consistent laws will facilitate flow of E-Com-
merce and the sale of goods and services. 344 Some commenta-
tors argue that many current digital signature laws are inconsis-
tent with one another.345
Various jurisdictions have either enacted or are enacting
341. See Smith & Keehan, supra note 10, at 506 (describing that initial spectacular
growth and accelerating use of Internet among businesses and consumers has
prompted many banking industry analysts to predict widespread use of on line and
Internet banking by 2000); see also Barassi, supra note 26, at 16 (explaining that E-
Commerce and state of industry involved in building emerging digital authentication
infrastructure are in relatively nascent state).
342. See Smith & Keehan, supra note 10, at 506-07 (stating that online banking will
decrease greatly if uniform, comprehensive laws are not enacted); see also Tom Forem-
ski, Web Browsers Beat Brick and Mortar, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1996, at 4 (showing that
online banking could potentially increase from 700,000 users in 1995 to over five mil-
lion users in year 2000).
343. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-102 (1995) (stating purpose of Utah Act is "to
establish, in coordination with multiple states, uniform rules regarding the authentica-
tion and reliability of electronic messages"); see also Draft Directive, supra note 299,
COM (1998) 297 Final, art. 3(2) (allowing Member States of European Union to intro-
duce voluntary accreditation schemes, as long as they follow uniform rules of being
"objective, transparent, proportionate, and non-discriminatory").
344. See Ballen & Fox, supra note 20, at 342 (arguing that any potential conflict
between statutes addressing E-Commerce transactions must be resolved). Suppose that
each jurisdiction that has digital signature statutes has a different standard for CAs and
legal recognition of digital signatures. Id. In order for a business to take advantage of
digital signatures, the business would have either to undertake operational and liability
standards of acting as a CA or to rely on numerous individual CAs that are recognized
in their individual jurisdiction. Id.
345. See Kiefer, supra note 21, at 9 (explaining that Germany and Malaysia have
laws that entail significant state involvement); see also Barassi, supra note 26 (citing
Spain, which has called for general methods that establish inalterability, integrity, or
uniformity of signed electronic message).
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digital signature schemes. 4 6 Digital signature legislation has
been not only introduced globally, but also enacted by individual
jurisdictions within a country.347 Many U.S. states have adopted
their own digital signature laws.348 Some have followed or have
used the Utah Act,3 4 9 and some have openly rejected using the
Utah Act, preferring instead to create their own legislative
scheme.35 0
Some of these laws either conflict with one another or may
not legally recognize digital signatures from other jurisdic-
tions.351 Commentators recognize both the need for consistent
statutes that can fully exploit E-Commerce and the need to re-
solve the potential for conflict among current laws. 2 For exam-
ple, members of the U.S. Congress have acknowledged that con-
flicting digital signature laws will have a serious negative impact
on the nationwide development of electronic banking and over-
346. See Winn, supra note 14, at 1179 (stating that many localities, nations, and
global organizations have enacted or are considering enacting laws governing use of
digital signatures).
347. See Kiefer, supra note 21, at 8 (stating that more than 40 state legislatures are
working on electronic authentication statutes); see also Hill, supra note 150, at 12 (stat-
ing that 30 U.S. states and District of Columbia have enacted legislation on digital signa-
ture use).
348. See Nora M. Jordan & Terrance J. O'Malley, Digital Signatures and the State Law
Hurdle, 2 No. 2 WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: SEc.ELEC.AGE1 (July 1998) (summarizing state
action on digital signature legislation).
349. See Minnesota Electronic Authentication Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325K et seq.
(West 1998) (setting forth Minnesota law that recognizes digital signatures in all com-
munications); Washington Electronic Authentication Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 19.34 (West 1998) (citing Washington state law that recognizes use of digital signa-
tures in all communications); Biddle, supra note 91, at 1233 (stating that Minnesota and
Washington had enacted laws that closely tracked Utah Act);
350. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 16.5 (West 1998) (setting forth California law that
limits scope of approval of digital signatures to communications among government
entities); Biddle, supra note 91, at 1233 (stating that California considered and rejected
Utah Act as model for its law and instead enacted non-technology-specific bill designed
to address transactions with government entities).
351. See Gesetz zur digitalen Signatur (Signaturgesetz), v. <22.7.1997> (BGB1. I S.
1870, 1872) § 15 (stating that foreign digital signatures are equivalent under act if digi-
tal signature may be checked with public signature key for which foreign certificate of
another EU Member State or are from nations that are part of international agreement
with Germany).
352. Ballen & Fox, supra note 20, at 342; see Jordan & O'Malley, supra note 348
(discussing effect of uniformity on Internet as promoting E-Commerce). The Internet
can continue to attract customers because it is an established forum for commercial
activity. Jordan & O'Malley, supra. Jordan & O'Malley opine that nationwide legal uni-
formity through coordination by legislators and policy makers can greatly benefit the
great number of online businesses. Id.
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all E-Commerce. 53
Proponents of a global scheme also argue that these differ-
ent state and national laws do not fully address certain subject
matters and conflict with one another.35 4  Some jurisdictions
have enacted laws that do not fully define necessary legal param-
eters as they pertain to the use of a public key system."' Com-
mentators are also cautious of the degree of specification among
jurisdictions that have broadly defined authentication require-
ments with general and non-technical provisions. 356 Digital sig-
natures from these jurisdictions may be invalid in other jurisdic-
tions that have used specific and technical requirements.
3 57
Some scholars note that the differences in approaches may not
derive from the differences in legal tradition or in technological
preferences, but rather from the propensities of the drafters.358
Proponents of a global scheme fear that the biggest threat
to E-Commerce is the current lack of uniformity among digital
signature legislation. 359 They argue that in the current interna-
353. Smith & Keehan, supra note 10, at 509; seeJordan & O'Malley, supra note 348
(assessing effect of lack of uniformity on financial institutions). This lack of uniformity
poses significant problems for financial institutions or any other entity that generates
substantial online revenue through a nationwide base of customers. Jordan &
O'Malley, supra. For example, national online brokerage firms must decide either to
require paper-based signatures from all customers or to conduct business differently
with customers depending on the applicable state law. Id. Both options entail signifi-
cant costs that will probably be absorbed by all customers. Id.
354. See Barassi, supra note 26 (arguing that most of these laws are based on as-
sumption that authentication infrastructure will be based on use of digital certificate-
based public key cryptography)
355. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-305(1) (1995) (stating that subscriber identified
in certificate assumes duty to exercise reasonable care to retain control of private key);
see also id. § 46-3-103 (failing to define reasonable care).
356. See Barassi, supra note 26 (citing Spain, which has called for general methods
that establish inalterability, integrity, or uniformity of signed electronic message).
357. See Gesetz zur digitalen Signatur (Signaturgesetz), v. <22.7.1997> (BGB1. I S.
1870, 1872) § 2(1) (defining digital signature in terms of using public key); see also id.
§ 46-3-305 (discussing control of private key).
358. See Barassi, supra note 26 (explaining that these drafters may interject their
own thoughts and biases about future of digital signature development or their uses in
international transactions). Malaysia and Utah have legislation that is very similar ex-
cept Malaysia mandates that CAs must obtain licenses. Id.
359. Id.; see Jordan & O'Malley, supra note 348 (discussing U.S. states' progress in
digital signature legislation). Jordan & O'Malley argue that while the efforts of the
states are encouraging, the lack of uniformity among state statutes is a substantial obsta-
cle to firms seeking legal certainty in servicing clients across jurisdictions. Jordan &
O'Malley, supra. Even in states where electronically created signatures are generally
acceptable for all transactions, different limitations exist on the type of signature that
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tional legal environment regarding digital signatures, this lack of
uniformity can create difficulties for transacting parties using
digital signatures. 6 ° For example, a majority of jurisdictions are
proposing or have created a high degree of state intervention in
the public key infrastructure. 361 This state intervention may fur-
ther hamper international transactions by burdening parties and
the emerging legal infrastructure with inconsistent obliga-
tions.362
Because E-Commerce is in its nascent stages, some legal ex-
perts argue that the legal infrastructure regarding digital signa-
tures should be consistent in order to protect it and to help it
develop.Y Some digital signature laws differ on legally accepta-
ble definitions for a certain aspect of digital signatures.3 64 For
example, the Utah Act defines a digital signature as a transfor-
mation of an electronic message by an asymmetric cryptosys-
tem.365 The German Act has a different definition.366 Another
problem is that if a transaction uses a digital signature that does
not use the private key-public key model then the transaction
may not be recognized by any jurisdiction because the current
laws require use of the private key-public key model.167 The total
will be considered effective. Id. Some states allow the use of electronic signatures,
while other states require digital signatures, and they do not differentiate between both
terms. Id.
360. Barassi, supra note 26.
361. See id. (stating that state intervention may cause non-uniform legal regime by
creating conflicting substantive and procedural requirements for transacting parties).
362. See Sabett, supra note 16, at 536 (stating that digital signature technology has
matured significantly and that technology should be elevated to level of legal accepta-
bility, both domestically and internationally).
363. Barassi, supra note 26; see Philip S. Corwin, Digital Signatures and Signature Dy-
namics: Some Issues to Consider, 17 NUMBER. 9 BANKING POL'Y REP. 1, 1 (1998) (arguing
that E-Commerce can not thrive in vacuum and that it requires atmosphere of support-
ive rules). Corwin suggests that new multinational treaties and conventions can assure
that global digital signature systems achieve interoperability and mutual recognition of
legal rights and duties. Corwin, supra.
364. Smith & Keehan, supra note 10, at 512.
365. Id.; see UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-103(10) (1995) (defining digital signature as
transformation of message through use of asymmetric cryptography such that recipient
of message can use sender's public key to determine whether transformation was cre-
ated by using sender's private key and whether message was altered since transforma-
tion was made).
366. See Gesetz zur digitalen Signatur (Signaturgesetz), v. <22.7.1997> (BGB1. I S.
1870, 1872) § 2(1) (defining digital signature as seal created with private key).
367. Smith & Keehan, supra note' 10, at 512; see German Act, supra note 259, at
§ 2(1) (stating that digital signature is created with private key); see also id. § 46-3-
103(10) (defining digital signature through uses of public and private keys).
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effect of all these laws is that international transactions may be-
come illegal and in the very least, the legal status of such transac-
tions is uncertain.368 One commentator has stated that the vari-
ous legislative efforts create both an outright conflict concerning
digital signature authentication and disharmony in E-Com-
merce.
3 6 9
B. Arguments Against a Global Regulatory Scheme for Digital
Signatures Legal Scheme Will Promote E-Commerce
Opponents of a global regulatory scheme for digital signa-
tures argue that such a scheme would hamper the development
and use of E-Commerce. 370 This type of scheme may impose
regulations with a specific view of E-Commerce and would create
market distortions if this view were not attained.3 7 ' Some com-
mentators also argue that an international digital signature
scheme will create administrative problems and will take many
years to implement fully.3
72
1. A Global Regulatory Scheme for Digital Signatures Will
Hamper E-Commerce
Opponents of a global scheme argue that E-Commerce
practices and standards have to come from the market.373 They
further argue that policy makers create these rules to anticipate
any potential problems for digital signatures and that these pol-
icy makers may dictate a standard that may be abandoned or
inefficient.374 Opponents also argue that digital signature legis-
368. See Signaturgesetz, § 15 (allowing digital signature certificates from EU Mem-
ber States or from nations that have treaty with Germany); see also Buenting, supra note
260, at 19 (stating that Germany has not yet signed treaty with United States regarding
acknowledgement of U.S. digital signatures).
369. Barassi, supra note 26.
370. See Kiefer, supra note 21, at 11 (citing criticism of German Act as being inflex-
ible and creating potential barriers for non-German companies).
371. See Biddle, supra note 91, at 1245 (arguing that time for legislation is after
identifiable problems exist in mature industry and that premature regulation creates
market distortions, which prevent E-Commerce from reaching its full potential).
372. See Juan Andres Avellan V, John Hancock in Borderless Cyberspace: The Cross-Juris-
dictional Validity of Electronic Signatures and Certificates in Recent Legislative Texts, 38
JURIMETRICS J. 301, 310 (1998) (stating international agreements take years to draft,
negotiate, and to implement by each nation involved).
373. Biddle, supra note 91, at 1226.
374. See Avellan, supra note 372, at 309 (arguing that current legislative ap-
proaches focus on technology of digital signatures); see also Biddle, supra note 91, at
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lation cannot currently deal with liability issues and must allow
the market to dictate these liability standards.375
a. Global Regulatory Scheme for Digital Signatures Will
Improperly Anticipate Potential Problems with
Digital Signatures
Opponents of current digital signature schemes argue that
the emergence of E-Commerce has caused reliant interest
groups to put pressure on legislatures to consider devising regu-
latory schemes even before it is clear whether Internet business
models will be successful.3 76 Opponents also note that, at this
nascent stage of E-Commerce, a global regulatory scheme for
digital signatures may not be able to resolve potential or un-
known issues.3 7 7 They maintain that E-Commerce has to evolve
naturally according to market dictates.3 78 Accordingly, they con-
tend that any type of digital signature legislation cannot pre-
scribe the evolution of E-Commerce because such legislation
may presume an untenable vision of E-Commerce. 379 Once en-
acted and followed, this legislation may pose a significant risk of
distorting an infant market and locking in business models that
may not only harm consumers, but also hamper the future devel-
opment of E-Commerce. 8 One expert has argued that re-
fraining from legislation will permit the market to continue to
develop without the distorting effects of unresponsive regula-
tion. 3
8 1
1228 (positing that most flaws in cryptography-related legislation are attributed to inad-
equate technical knowledge by the drafters).
375. See Biddle, supra note 91, at 1226 (arguing that policy makers have assumed
that CA's potential liability is flaw of current laws and these policy makers use digital
signature legislation to shift immense liability burden onto consumers who use public
key infrastructure).
376. See Winn, supra note 14, at 1253 (stating that Clinton Administration's policy
on E-Commerce is that, in absence of information showing need for regulation, legisla-
tures should be hesitant to intervene in working of marketplace).
377. See Dorney, supra note 171, at 149 (stating that some critics think that it is too
early to adopt universal technological standards for technology that is likely to evolve
over time than be force to evolve through set legislative standards).
378. Biddle, supra note 91, at 1226.
379. See id. (explaining that some digital signature legislation anticipate E-Com-
merce to evolve according to enacted standards and not according to marketplace).
380. Id.
381. See Winn, supra note 14, at 1258-59 (concluding that developers and promot-
ers of public key cryptography are seeking legislative efforts to shield them from poten-
tial liability). Sheltering developers will prevent developers from trying to improve
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b. Defining a Liability Framework for Digital Signatures Can
Cause Problems at This Nascent Stage
Opponents of a global regulatory scheme for digital signa-
tures maintain that defining a liability scheme for digital signa-
tures is not presently feasible.382 Public key infrastructure pro-
ponents suggest that a digital signature legal framework resolves
many issues surrounding liability.183 These proponents propose
that a global scheme will contain explicit liability provisions and
thereby bring certainty to international E-Commerce transac-
tions.3 84 Some legal scholars counter this proposition by arguing
that an open public key infrastructure implicates considerable
liability risk and that this risk has to be understood before any
legislation proceeds.385 They further argue that current digital
signature schemes protect CAs386 and developers, while shifting
all the risk to users.3 87 Opponents of a global scheme maintain
that this type of liability allocation system not only harms users in
the short term, but also will harm developers in the long term.388
overall security of public key cryptography systems. Id. Legislators should refrain from
enacting digital signature statutes in order to allow the market to continue to develop.
Id.
382. Id. at 1177; see Biddle, supra note 91, at 1237-38 (arguing that currently no
satisfactory solution exists for liability issues with public key infrastructure). If liability
loss fell on party relying on digital signatures, then the goals of a public key infrastruc-
ture would be undermined because of great opportunity for fraudulent collusion. Bid-
die, supra, at 1237. If liability loss fell on party whose digital signature was used, then no
consumer would accept this level of risk. Id. at 1236.
383. Winn, supra note 14, at 1177.
384. See Dorney, supra note 171, at 150 (stating that legal status of digital signature
may be uncertain). It is possible that a digital signature would be found to be a signa-
ture, but the result is very uncertain. Id.
385. See Biddle, supra note 91, at 1235 (arguing that liability exposure faced by CAs
with open public key infrastructure model is product of business model that can not
internalize costs of fraud that may result under any public key-based system).
386. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-309 (1995) (limiting damages against CAs by not
holding CAs liable for any loss caused by reliance on false signatures if CA complied
with Utah Act). A CA does not have to pay punitive or exemplary damages, damages
for lost opportunity, or pain and suffering damages. Id.
387. See Winn, supra note 14, at 1258-59 (describing impact of liability shifting
statutes). Developers and promoters of digital signatures are seeking legislative safe
harbors in order to permit them to focus solely on the work of building a public key
infrastructure. Id. at 1258.
388. See id. (stating potential effect on users and developers). Less sophisticated
consumers will bear potential, overwhelming losses under a liability system. Id. Devel-
opers are also harmed because many users will not utilize their designs. Id. In addi-
tion, developers may lose the incentive to improve the overall security of E-Commerce
transactions. Id.
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They contend that liability issues must be fully known and un-
derstood before they can be solved global regulatory scheme."'
2. A Global Regulatory Scheme for Digital Signatures Will
Produce Administrative Problems in Trying to Create
and to Implement the Proper Type of
Digital Signature Legislation
Opponents argue that a global regulatory scheme for digital
signatures will be difficult to formulate using current informa-
tion.390 They further argue that even if a global scheme were
adopted, all nations involved in the scheme would take years to
create legislation. 9' If a global scheme were implemented, then
it might over-regulate E-Commerce and interfere in the func-
tioning of the market.392
a. Global Regulatory Scheme for Digital Signatures Cannot
Proscribe the Proper Type of Digital Signature
Legislation in Order to Utilize
E-Commerce Fully
Opponents of a global regulatory scheme for digital signa-
tures question whether the global scheme will be one that is
either technology-neutral or technology-specific.393 Proponents
of cryptography products advocate enacting technology-specific
legislation because it endorses what they believe is the best solu-
tion available to the problem of authenticating users over inse-
cure networks.3 4 This type of legislation can pave the way for
uniform digital signature standards. 95
389. Id.
390. Id. at 1182; see Biddle, supra note 91, at 1245 (explaining that legislation is
created when mature industry or market exists and digital signatures are not fully devel-
oped in their uses). Biddle suggests that digital signature laws must allow E-Commerce
transactions to evolve unfettered with burdensome regulations. Biddle, supra. Only
then can digital signatures can reach its fullest potential. Id.
391. Avellan, supra note 372, at 310; see Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 3, at
308 (explaining that some jurisdictions have laws regarding use of signatures).
392. Winn, supra note 14, at 1181; see Avellan, supra note 372, at 310 (positing that
recognition of digital signatures by individuals governments under global scheme
would turn into discriminatory practice in order to promote their domestic groups).
393. See Winn, supra note 14, at 1177 (arguing that technology-neutral approach
to Internet legislation can permit parties to commercial transactions to make up their
own minds about what new business practices make sense for Internet commerce).
394. Id. at 1181.
395. See Kuner, supra note 273 (citing goals of German Act, which is technical law
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Other scholars argue that a global regulatory scheme for
digital signatures should have a technology-neutral approach be-
cause this approach allows parties to commercial transactions to
determine their own E-Commerce business practices.396 Tech-
nology-neutral advocates believe that digital signature legislation
should eliminate any residual disparities between the legal status
of accepted business transactions and E-Commerce.397 Any pre-
mature regulation can create market distortions that would pre-
vent E-Commerce from coming to its fruition.398
One commentator notes that at this time, it is unclear what
authentication, business, or technical standards will gain accept-
ance.399 Also unclear is what individual users, businesses, and
other parties may accept or even be expected to accept.400 Op-
ponents of a global regulatory scheme for digital signatures ar-
gue that legislating any sort of risk allocation scheme before any
E-Commerce business practices have become established can
create an unresponsive regulatory framework. 40 1  They argue
that the time for regulation is after identifiable problems appear
in a mature and ongoing industry, before an industry exists. 40 2
that was created to provide conditions for secure infrastructure for use of digital signa-
tures in Germany). The German government is open about its intention to create a de
facto standard for the use of digital signatures. Id. The law was intended to lead to a
competitive, market-driven procedure for digital signatures in Germany. Id.
396. Winn, supra note 14, at 1177.
397. See id. at 1181 (arguing that until full maturation of E-Commerce, no compet-
ing business model for E-Commerce security should be legislatively endorsed).
398. See Biddle, supra note 91, at 1245 (arguing that this result may be better deter-
mined by market forces rather than results envisioned by governmental policymakers).
399. Winn, supra note 14, at 1181; see id. at 1182 (stating that in absence of any
concrete information about what constitutes reasonable business practices and reason
able computer security standards in this new environment, it is unclear what will consti-
tute fair and efficient loss allocation system).
400. See id. at 1182-83 (citing presumption for validity of written signatures as relia-
ble evidence of intent to be bound is grounded on well-established connection consist-
ently observed over centuries). No basis in experience exists for extending the same,
tested presumption to any electronic authentication procedure like a digital signature.
Id.
401. See id. at 1183 (arguing that there is limited knowledge in area of E-Com-
merce). Winn argues that more knowledge is needed about how these new technolo-
gies will actually be used by the merchants and consumers that they are designed to
benefit. Id.
402. Biddle, supra note 91, at 1245.
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b. Restraint on E-Commerce-Problems Enacting and
Implementing a Digital Signature Scheme
Opponents of global regulatory scheme for digital signa-
tures argue that this type of law may over regulate the use of
digital signatures or even create strict, unnecessary require-
ments. 40 3 They argue that these requirements can hinder E-
Commerce and ultimately halt the full exploration of digital sig-
nature uses.4 0 4 One expert has suggested that these issues arise
mainly because of policy makers' lack of understanding of this
technology and its potential uses.40 5
In addition to legislators' incomplete knowledge, some
commentators have suggested that another factor to consider is
that an international agreement on digital signatures may be im-
practical and ultimately become a tremendous undertaking.4"6
A meeting of all concerned nations, businesses, and other inter-
ests may not reach a result that is beneficial to E-Commerce.4 °7
Typically, international agreements take years to negotiate, then
to draft, and then finally to have legislation that must be passed
by the legislatures of each party that implements the agree-
ment.4
08
.
Some commentators contend that individual legislatures
403. See Kiefer, supra note 21, at 11 (stating that some domestic and international
commentators criticize German Act for being inflexible and taking overly regulated
approach). The German Act imposes stringent licensing terms on CAs by requiring
users to present their identification physically to a CA in order to get a digital signature.
Id. This stringent requirement for becoming a licensed CA can create a barrier for
non-German companies acting as CAs. Id.
404. See id. at 11-12 (citing possible effects of German Act). The German Act's
strict licensing terms may stop the possibility of Internet-delivered certificates because
users have to be physically present with identification in order to get a digital signature.
Id.
405. See Biddle, supra note 91, at 1228 (explaining that flaws in cryptography-re-
lated legislation could be attributed to inadequate technical knowledge by policy mak-
ers).
406. See Avellan, supra note 372, at 310 (arguing that creating international agree-
ment would be most complex way of solving problem of ensuring that digital signatures
are legally valid).
407. See Parker, supra note 24 (describing environment surrounding digital signa-
ture discussions at United Nations). When the Model Law on Electronic Commerce
was ratified by the United Nations in January 1997, the United Nations Commission on
Electronic Trade turned its attention to a heated debate on a model digital signature
law in the closing weeks of February. Id.
408. See Avellan, supra note 372, at 310 (explaining that these agreements may
eventually become agreements on general principles with little room for details).
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may have difficulty in passing legislation implementing a global
regulatory scheme for digital signatures because this interna-
tional agreement may invalidate certain local and state laws.4" 9
Provisions in an international legal scheme could invalidate
their enacted state and federal laws regarding electronic transac-
tions.41 These national schemes have been set up to deal with a
country's specific policy concerns about E-Commerce and an in-
ternational agreement would defeat a country's policy. 1
c. A Global Regulatory Scheme for Digital Signatures Would
Introduce Unnecessary Government Interference
in E-Commerce
Opponents of a digital signature scheme maintain that legal
issues that are raised by the increase in E-Commerce should not
become a pretext for heavy-handed government intervention.4 12
They argue that the explosion of digital signature legislation is
because legislators fear that E-Commerce transactions and digi-
tal signatures will not be legally recognized .41 3 Opponents fur-
ther contend that this legislation is unnecessary because some
courts have indicated that the law can be flexible and supportive
409. See Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 3, at 308 (stating that some states or
localities can impose writing requirements). A global regulatory scheme for digital sig-
natures may invalidate these requirements, which can range from basic contract re-
quirements, such as a state's statute of frauds laws, to notarization and attestation issues.
Id.
410. See Ballen & Fox, supra note 20, at 343 (explaining that United States federal
government has certain federal writing requirements, most of which are intended as
consumer protection measures, that require financial institutions to provide consumers
with various disclosures in writing). For example, a global regulatory scheme for digital
signatures may invalidate the federal Electronic Fund Transfer Act and the Federal Re-
serve Board's Regulation E. Id. Both of these measures require financial institutions
that offer electronic fund transfers to their consumers to provide them with various
disclosures in writing. Id. The writing requirement has been interpreted as requiring
traditional paper writing and this requirement can not be altered by agreement. Id. at
343-44.
411. See Gesetz zur digitalen Signatur (Signaturgesetz), v. <22.7.1997> (BGBI. I S.
1870, 1872) § 1 (stating purpose of German Act is to create conditions for digital signa-
tures under which they may be deemed secure and forgeries of digital signatures may
be ascertained).
412. See Winn, supra note 14, at 1181 (arguing that current market is functioning
and that no compelling evidence exists to show that competitive market forces are fail-
ing to achieve fair and efficient result).
413. See Biddle, supra note 91, at 1244 (stating that legislators have mistaken im-
pression that special legal rules are needed to accommodate E-Commerce).
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of new commercial methods, such as digital signatures.4" 4 Oppo-
nents also state that broad-based legislation is not needed to ac-
commodate digital signatures, public key cryptography, or any
other emerging authentication technology.415 Business con-
ducted through the Internet is rapidly expanding and is not yet
encumbered with an intrusive, unresponsive, regulatory struc-
ture.4 1 6 Opponents maintain that an international agreement
on digital signatures might require the creation and mainte-
nance of a complex, expensive, and even unnecessary bureau-
cracy.
41 7
III. A GLOBAL REGULATORY SCHEME FOR DIGITAL
SIGNATURES WILL PROTECT E-COMMERCE BY
ELIMINATING CONFLICTS OF LAW AD
PROVIDING GUIDELINES TO PARTIES
A global regulatory scheme for digital signatures is the best
414. See Hessenthalar v. Farzin, 564 A.2d 990 (Pa. Super Ct. 1989) (holding that
mailgram meets requirement for signature under Pennsylvania Statute of Frauds). The
Pennsylvania Superior Court emphasized that "there is no requirement in the Statute
or the decisional law that a signature be in any particular form. Instead, the focus has
been on whether there is some reliable indication that the person to be charged with
performing under the writing intended to authenticate it." Id. at 993; see Clyburn v.
Allstate, 826 F. Supp. 955 (D.S.C. 1993) (holding that since information on disk can be
retrieved and printed as on paper, delivery of information on computer disk constitutes
writing under insurance statute). The district court stated that "[i]n today's 'paperless'
society of computer generated information, the court is not prepared, in the absence of
some legislative provision or otherwise, to find that a computer floppy diskette would
not constitute a 'writing' within the meaning of [statute]." Clyburn, 826 F. Supp at 957;
see Benjamin Wright, Electronic Commerce Legislation: Frequently Asked Questions, 2
NUMBER. 2 CYBERSPACE LAW. 10 (1997) (arguing that current law is quite flexible and
supportive of new methods).
415. See Massachusetts Electronic Records and Signatures Act § 2(b) (draft Nov. 4, 1997)
(visited Jan. 15, 1999) <http://www.magnet.state.ma.us/itd/legal/mersa.htm> (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal) (stating purpose of Massachusetts Electronic
Records and Signatures Act "is to permit and encourage continued expansion of elec-
tronic commerce and online government through operation of free market forces
rather than proscriptive legislation"); see also Biddle, supra note 91, at 1244 (suggesting
that broad based legislation is not needed to accommodate public key cryptography or
other emerging authentication technologies). Biddle suggests that areas where current
legal rules hinder E-Commerce can be addressed with narrowly targeted legislation.
Biddle, supra.
416. Winn, supra note 14, at 1181.
417. See Dorney, supra note 171, at 149 (positing possible results of international
agreement might require implementation of standard regulations and requirements for
system of CAs). This system could be complex, costly for users, and hard to maintain
for government and private industry. Id.
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approach to protect digital signatures. A global regulatory
scheme for digital signatures will eliminate the current conflicts
of laws situation regarding digital signatures.418 This scheme can
also assist parties in developing uniform digital signatures.41Y
The ultimate purpose of the scheme is to protect and to utilize
E-Commerce fully.420
A. A Global Regulatory Scheme for Digital Signatures Will Eliminate
Conflicts of Law and Promote International
E-Commerce Transactions
Proponents of a global regulatory scheme for digital signa-
tures are correct because a global scheme will protect E-Com-
merce from inconsistent regulations.4 ' Many different levels of
government have considered or proposed digital signature stat-
utes.4 22 These statutes address digital signatures from different
approaches and these different approaches will hamper interna-
tional E-Commerce transactions using digital signatures. 4 2
Although opponents of a global scheme argue that such a
scheme would hinder the development of E-Commerce, they fail
to take account of the present legal situation with the conflicting
digital signature legislation.4 2 4 A global regulatory scheme for
digital signatures can establish consistent, uniform rules applica-
ble to digital signatures and will promote international E-Com-
418. See supra notes 21-23 (stating that numerous nations have enacted digital sig-
nature laws and that certain U.S. states have already setup a legal framework regarding
digital signatures).
419. See supra notes 335-37 and accompanying text (arguing that global digital sig-
nature legal scheme will facilitate E-Commerce by allowing parties to design their trans-
actions according to enacted rules).
420. See supra notes 153-55 (arguing that digital signatures are catalyst to expand E-
Commerce because digital signatures can authenticate identities of parties on In-
ternet).
421. See supra notes 354-58 (arguing that current digital signatures laws conflict
with one another).
422. See supra notes 167, 170-71, 256-58, and accompanying text (stating that nu-
merous governments have enacted digital signature legislation).
423. See supra notes 359-62 and accompanying text (arguing that differentjurisdic-
tions have different digital signature laws and that these different laws will hamper in-
ternational transactions because parties will have to comply with numerous digital sig-
nature laws imposed by their respective countries).
424. See supra notes 377-80 and accompanying text (arguing that digital signature
legislation can not mandate evolution of E-Commerce, which must occur according to
dictates of market).
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merce transactions.423
E-Commerce transactions relate to the unfettered flow of in-
formation using a network such as the Internet.4 26 Digital signa-
tures can further facilitate E-Commerce transactions because
digital signatures serve security, non-repudiation, and eviden-
tiary functions.4 27 Different schemes create hurdles for digital
signature use and may slow or even block the flow of goods and
services that arise from E-Commerce.42 8
B. A Global Regulatory Scheme for Digital Signatures Will Guide
Parties in Digital Signature Transactions
A global regulatory scheme for digital signatures will pro-
vide guidance by legally recognizing certain mechanisms of digi-
tal signatures.429 A law could permit the use of CAs and then
monitor them.43 0 Opponents counter that digital signature leg-
islation cannot predict the development of digital signatures431
and therefore cannot resolve liability issues.43 2 This argument
fails to recognize that a uniform, global standard is better than
haphazard legislation that creates greater uncertainty in the in-
ternational arena, decreases E-Commerce activities, and resolves
no issues.4 3 3 A regulatory scheme for digital signatures on a
global scale will proscribe guidelines for the interaction between
425. See supra notes 338-41 and accompanying text (explaining that globally recog-
nized standard will promote E-Commerce transactions using digital signatures by giving
guidance to parties involved in E-Commerce).
426. See supra note 1 (defining E-Commerce).
427. See supra notes 106-33 (discussing security, non-repudiation, and evidentiary
functions that digital signatures serve).
428. See supra notes 330-32 and accompanying text (arguing that parties in interna-
tional E-Commerce transactions are confused in determining legal treatment of digital
signatures).
429. See supra notes 335-37 and accompanying text (stating that global digital sig-
nature laws will legally recognize digital signature infrastructure and permit further
development of this structure).
430. See supra notes 338-40 and accompanying text (giving example that if law rec-
ognized CAs, E-Commerce transactions involving digital signatures will be more secure
because of legal recognition duties of CA).
431. See supra notes 379-81 and accompanying text (arguing that digital signature
legislation can not dictate evolution of E-Commerce and may hinder future develop-
ment of E-Commerce by requiring all E-Commerce transactions to follow legislation
that may not be utilized in future).
432. See supra notes 385-89 and accompanying text (arguing that open public key
infrastructure creates significant amounts of risk and that current legislation shifts all
this risk onto users).
433. See supra notes 329, 351-53, and accompanying text (stating that consistent
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all parties engaging in E-Commerce transactions.4 4
C. A Global Regulatory Scheme for Digital Signatures Will Allow for
Full Exploration of E-Commerce
One of the ultimate benefits of a global regulatory scheme
for digital signatures is the increase and full utilization of E-Com-
merce throughout all economic sectors.43 5 Opponents of a
global scheme argue that such a scheme would be difficult to
create, to implement, and to administer.436 This argument fails
to consider the need to protect E-Commerce and digital signa-
tures at this nascent stage with consistent laws.437 Digital signa-
tures can be used over the Internet in any situation where any
party, from any location, wants to enter into a contract.43 8
CONCLUSION
Digital signatures can open E-Cornmerce and create new
economic opportunities and new ways of doing business that
would benefit businesses and consumers. By ensuring the secur-
ity and integrity of electronic transmissions, digital signatures
provide a foundation for the new age of E-Commerce. In order
to apply digital signatures fully, policy makers must enact a
global regulatory scheme that must set forth the legal framework
for conducting E-Commerce. Policy makers must enact this
legal regime on a global level in order to promote the flow of
goods and services through E-Commerce and to prevent any in-
consistent measures that would hinder this flow.
statutes can allow parties to exploit E-Commerce fully and to prevent decline in E-Com-
merce that can be result of current, non-consistent regime among different nations).
434. See supra notes 226-55 (stating Utah Act, which sets forth legal framework for
all parties that use digital signatures).
435. See supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text (exploring possibilities and op-
portunities that full maturation of E-Commerce would bring).
436. See supra notes 393-402 and accompanying text (arguing that creating global
regulatory scheme for digital signatures would be difficult because of deciding type of
legislation that scheme would entail); see also supra notes 403-11 (describing problems
of implementing potential international scheme).
437. See supra notes 363-69 and accompanying text (stating that E-Commerce is in
initial stages and that differing standards can thwart international transactions).
438. See supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text (listing many uses for digital
signatures as means to enter into any sensitive or non-sensitive transaction normally
done on paper).
